1- (Total of gm) Stai and R are two statistical software companies competing for users from economics department all over the world {for simplicity we assume there is no other statistical software companies). Each of the two statistical software companies can brand themselves as being either open source {05) (where users have a lot of freedom but simple tasks are harder to perform) or private {P} [where users can perform simple tasks very easily but complicated tasks are much harder to perform]. Furthermore, let us assume that the number of users they will get not only depends on their choice of strategy. but also of the other company's strategy. The number of users they can get is displayed in the following game: a. (Sptsl What is the lowest value that x can take such E has a dominant strategy? b. (g-3;} What is the lowest value that y can take such ag has a dominant strategy? c. tzpts} Plugging the x and y you found in part a and b, what is the Nash equilibrium? For part d) and e), let us assume that x = no and y = 40. Furthermore, R found a new investors such that if they go private the investor can guarantee an extra number of users 2. The payoff matrix is now: [EH- \"- d. (55:15} What is the minimum value of 2 such that private (P) is the dominant strategy for the software company R? e. (gpt_s) Plugging the 2 you found In part u, what is the Nash equilibrium? f. (2pm Compare the results of the Nash equilibrium you found in part c} to the Nash equilibrium you found in part e}