Question
1. Virgil can choose either a safe or a risky project. To keep things simple, lets say either project costs $100. A safe project yields
1. Virgil can choose either a safe or a risky project. To keep things simple, lets say either project costs $100. A safe project yields $114 with certainty, while a risky project is equally likely to yield $208 or zero. Virgil needs financing for 50 percent of the cost of his project. Lenders cannot observe his choice of project. Everyone is risk neutral, and the risk-free rate is 6%.
- If Virgil were to sell $50 worth of bonds with face value equal to $53, in which project would he invest? Justify your answer. How much would bondholders get paid, on average?
- How much face value would Virgil need to offer lenders in order to sell $50 worth of bonds?
- Is Virgil willing to offer the face value required to sell bonds? Explain.
- Is Virgil willing to finance a project by selling shares? Are savers willing to purchase his shares? Does financing with equity yield an efficient equilibrium?
2. Calpurnia wants to finance her education, plus buy a home. She needs to borrow $500,000, and the risk free rate is 5%. She can try to obtain financing by selling either debt or equity. Calpurnias job pays a salary of $75,000 per year. If she works hard, she has a 50 percent chance of getting a promotion and an increase in her salary to $125,000. If Calpurnia devotes minimal effort to her job, her salary will remain at $75,000. Calpurnias disutility of working hard is $20,000. Everyone is risk neutral, and all the surplus goes to Calpurnia. Assume asymmetric information.
- How much is Calpurnias annual cost of funds?
- Hard work generates how much surplus? Explain.
- In an equity sale, Calpurnia must try to sell at least a 1/4 share. Why?
- If savers were to accept a 1/4 share, would Calpurnia work hard? Show your computations. How big a share do savers require?
- In equilibrium, does she obtain financing by using debt or by using equity? Show your computations. Is the equilibrium efficient?
- Describe the asymmetric information problem: Who cant observe what?
- Would savers accept a 1/4 share if information were symmetric? Explain.
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