10. Consider the used car market with adverse selection as in Akerlof's market for lemons. As in Akerlof's model discussed in this course, suppose the quality of used cars, X, is a uniform distribution between 0 and 100, X}- denotes the quality of car j , sellers value any car j at X -, and buyers value any car j at 1.5 x X j (note that 3/2 = 1.5). Suppose the government sets a minimum car quality guarantee of X = 15. Recall that one price P exists in the market because buyers cannot observe car quality. (12 points total) a. Would buyers be willing to buy cars over a range of prices P? If buyers would be willing to buy cars at some range of P, buyers would be willing to buy cars at any price P below a specic price (given by an inequality). What is this specic price? (8 points) b. Briey explain how a government minimum car quality guarantee helps limit adverse selection in Akerlof's market for lemons. (4 points)