10a. Figure 3 shows the supply of offences per month in DC from two types of potential offenders, local residents (L) and tourists (T). The market for crime is shown on the right. The expected sanction for offending is equal for local residents and tourists as shown on the diagram. You predict that total offenses will be per month of which will be by tourists whose return net of sanctions will be Expected return Tourists Local Residents Figure 3 Market 150 1501 140 140 130 130 120 120 110 Su+pes 110 100 1001 90 90 80 Sr+pes 80 70 70 60 SL 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 D 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 40 60 80 90 100 120 140 SI 10b. Now assume DC gets statehood and the expected sanction against tourists is doubled (perhaps because police concentrate on crime by tourists). Modify Figure 3 accordingly. You predict that the number of offenses will now be per month and that will be by tourists whose return net of sanctions will be 10a. Figure 3 shows the supply of offences per month in DC from two types of potential offenders, local residents (L) and tourists (T). The market for crime is shown on the right. The expected sanction for offending is equal for local residents and tourists as shown on the diagram. You predict that total offenses will be per month of which will be by tourists whose return net of sanctions will be Expected return Tourists Local Residents Figure 3 Market 150 1501 140 140 130 130 120 120 110 Su+pes 110 100 1001 90 90 80 Sr+pes 80 70 70 60 SL 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 D 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 20 40 60 80 90 100 120 140 SI 10b. Now assume DC gets statehood and the expected sanction against tourists is doubled (perhaps because police concentrate on crime by tourists). Modify Figure 3 accordingly. You predict that the number of offenses will now be per month and that will be by tourists whose return net of sanctions will be