12. Consider two agents, Alice and Bob, who have utility functions 10.3.3 +0.714 if ra > 1B 10.3rA +0.773 if rb >IA UATA,1B) = UBOTA, 2B) = 4.0 A - 3.15 if rb > TA -0.32A + 1.3.0B if ra > XB If Alice is the dictator in the dictator game with a $10 endowment, then she will offer Bob (A) $0; (B) $5; (C) $2; (D) $10. 13. If Bob is the dictator in the dictator game with a $10 endowment, then he will offer Alice (A) $0; (B) $5; (C) $2; (D) $10. 14. In the ultimatum game with a $10 endowment where Bob is the dictator, Alice will reject the following offers (A) $2; (B) $3; (C) $4; (D) all of the above. 15. In the ultimatum game with a $10 endowment where Alice is the dictator, Bob will reject the following offers (A) $1; (B) $2; (C) $3; (D) all of the above. 16. The empirical evidence in the ultimatum bargaining games shows that people often reject offers that are smaller than $2 out of a $10 endowment. This behavior is an example of (A) backward induction; (B) spite; (C) selfishness; (D) all of the above. 17. Consider two agents, Ann and Bob, who have utility functions if BIA UA(2,A,2B) = {21 if I A2 23 UB(XA, XB) = | RA | -4.0A + 5.00 if IA > XB where x A and xb are the prizes obtained by Ann and Bob respectively. Ann's choices reveal (A) pure selfishness; (B) some altruism, no spite; (C) both altruism and spite; (D) some spite, no altruism. 18. If Ann is the dictator in the dictator game with a $10 endowment, then she will offer Bob (A) $0; (B) $5; (C) $2; (D) $10. 19. In the ultimatum game with a $10 endowment, Bob will reject the following offers (A) $1; (B) $2; (C) $3; (D) all of the above. 20. In the ultimatum game with a $10 endowment, Ann will reject the following offers (A) $1; (B) $2; (C) $3; (D) none of the above. 12. Consider two agents, Alice and Bob, who have utility functions 10.3.3 +0.714 if ra > 1B 10.3rA +0.773 if rb >IA UATA,1B) = UBOTA, 2B) = 4.0 A - 3.15 if rb > TA -0.32A + 1.3.0B if ra > XB If Alice is the dictator in the dictator game with a $10 endowment, then she will offer Bob (A) $0; (B) $5; (C) $2; (D) $10. 13. If Bob is the dictator in the dictator game with a $10 endowment, then he will offer Alice (A) $0; (B) $5; (C) $2; (D) $10. 14. In the ultimatum game with a $10 endowment where Bob is the dictator, Alice will reject the following offers (A) $2; (B) $3; (C) $4; (D) all of the above. 15. In the ultimatum game with a $10 endowment where Alice is the dictator, Bob will reject the following offers (A) $1; (B) $2; (C) $3; (D) all of the above. 16. The empirical evidence in the ultimatum bargaining games shows that people often reject offers that are smaller than $2 out of a $10 endowment. This behavior is an example of (A) backward induction; (B) spite; (C) selfishness; (D) all of the above. 17. Consider two agents, Ann and Bob, who have utility functions if BIA UA(2,A,2B) = {21 if I A2 23 UB(XA, XB) = | RA | -4.0A + 5.00 if IA > XB where x A and xb are the prizes obtained by Ann and Bob respectively. Ann's choices reveal (A) pure selfishness; (B) some altruism, no spite; (C) both altruism and spite; (D) some spite, no altruism. 18. If Ann is the dictator in the dictator game with a $10 endowment, then she will offer Bob (A) $0; (B) $5; (C) $2; (D) $10. 19. In the ultimatum game with a $10 endowment, Bob will reject the following offers (A) $1; (B) $2; (C) $3; (D) all of the above. 20. In the ultimatum game with a $10 endowment, Ann will reject the following offers (A) $1; (B) $2; (C) $3; (D) none of the above
