12 Let 31 : (pr, pM,pB) be the strategy of Player 1 (with pg: the probability of action 3') and 32 : ((31,, go, (13) be the strategy of Player 2 (with q; the probability of action 2'). Which is false for the following game? (A) (M,L) and [T,C) are the only pure strategy Nash equilibria (B) 31 : [0.5, 0.5, 0) and 32 : (0.5,0.5,0) is a Nash equilibrium (C) 31 = [025,075, 0) and 32 = (0.75, 025,0) is a Nash equilibrium (D) In any strictly mixed strategy equilibrium, Player 1 puts positive probability on T and M only, and Player 2 puts positive probability on L and C only