17. 18. 19. amount of agent. Note that the socially optimal quantity to be consmned of both myopic and rational agents is the same, and it is equal to Q\". If you could impose a different subsidy for rational agents and for myopic agents1 what would the two subsidy rates be? (2 points) What is the second-best subsidy for this good? (2 points) Suppose that this second-best subsidy is added into the market. Draw on top of this graph (or replicate your own version by hand if you prefer) and label (i) the after-subsidy price that results from imposing the second-best tax1 (ii) the quantity that myopic consumers would choose, (iii) the quantity that rational consumers would choose, and shade and label (iv) the deadweight loss associated with myopic consumers (if any), and (v) the deadweight loss associated with rational consumers (if any). (* 5 points)