1).Compare the value of the Sleeping and Napping bonds for interest rates greater than 7.55%. Which is worth more? Why? Do the same for interest rates below 7.55%. Which bond is more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations? Why? Flip to the next sheet of the Workbook, called Chart, to see the graphed values for the Sleeping and Napping bonds.

2)The next sheet in the Workbook is called "30-Year Bonds." It shows the cash flows to a 30-year bond in Column C, and the present value of each years cash flow for this bond (at a 7.55% interest rate) in Column D. Column E contains all zeros, except in year 30. The cash flow in that year is the value of $100 compounded forward for 30 years at 7.55%. This is known as a "zero-coupon bond." Column F shows the present value of each years cash flow for this bond. Bonds are always quoted in terms of repayment amounts. What is the price of the 30-year zero-coupon bond per $100 repaid in 2023?

How will the price of the 30-year zero change over time, if interest rates remain the same as when the bond was issued?

3)Suppose on the day after the Sleeping Beauties were sold, the prevailing interest rate increased one percentage point, i.e., from 7.55% to 8.55%. What would be the new price of the Sleeping Beauties? If the interest rate dropped by one percentage point, what would the price of the Sleeping Beauties become?

4)What does this say about the expected price path of the Sleeping Beauties as time passes, if interest rates remain around 7.55%? Suppose interest rates fluctuate wildly during the next two years and then stabilize again at around 7.55%. What do you predict would happen to the price of each of the bonds?

Walt Disney Company's Sleeping Beauty Bonds- Duration Analysis In July 1993, the Walt Disney Company issued $300,000,000 in senior debentures (bonds). The debentures carried an interest rate of 7.55%, payable semiannually, and were priced at "par". They were due to be repaid on July 15, 2093, a full one hundred years after the date of issue. However, at the company's option, the debentures could be repaid (in whole or in part) any time after July 15, 2023 or 30 years after the issue date. Beauty, the fairy tale princess and heroine of a popular Disney animated film, according to legend, slept under enchantment in a magic castle for one hundred years. The Disney 100-year debentures were immediately dubbed the "Sleeping Beauties." The issue caused a lot of comment among traders and portfolio managers. "It's crazy," said William Gross, head of fixed-income investments at Pacific Management Company. Look at the path of Coney Island over the last fifty years and see what happens to amusement parks." Scott Jacobson, head of fixed-income research at Piper Capital Management, felt that the bonds were too risky for his clients, but if corporate treasurers can get away with it, why not?"2 Others interpreted the successful sale of the bonds as a vote of confidence in the Disney Company and U.S. economic policy. "It shows that people believe the Mouse will still be singing and dancing in 100 years," said Tom Deegan (head of corporate communications at Disney). And Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors called the bonds "one of the more important indicators that the long-term inflation expectations that have so bedeviled our economy and financial markets seem to be receding ... a very good sign." As long-term interest rates declined in 1992 and 1993, companies and investors began to show renewed interest in very long-term maturities. The Tennessee Valley Authority (a government- owned hydroelectric power company) sold a 50-year bond in April 1992. Ford, Boeing, Texaco and Conrail followed with their own 50-year issues (irreverently dubbed Methuselah" bonds) in 1993. The Disney bonds were the first 100-year bonds to be issued since 1954, when the Chicago & Eastern Railroad (a subsidiary of Union Pacific) issued 5% bonds due in 2054. However, the award for longest lasting liability went to the Canadian Pacific Corporation, which was paying 4% on a 1000- year bond, issued by the Toronto Grey and Bruce Railway in 1883, and due to be repaid in 288315 The idea for the 100-year bond came from an institutional investor. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, an institution approached Morgan Stanley with a request for a 100-year corporate bond to balance its short-term holdings and lengthen the duration of its portfolio. Thus, according to one reporter, the 100-year bonds "were conceived by quantitative analysts tucked away in cramped rooms crowded with computer screens."6 The issue was priced on July 20, 1993 to yield .95% (95 basis points) over the benchmark 30- year Treasury bond. Analysts estimated that this was .15% to 20% more than Disney would have paid had it issued 30-year bonds. And Disney had the right to call the bonds after 30 years for 103.02% of face value. Thus thirty years hence, the company had the best of both worlds. If prevailing interest rates were low, it could call the bonds and replace them with a cheaper issue. But if interest rates were high, the bonds could remain out, continuing to pay 7.55%, for seventy more years! Demand was so brisk that the company doubled the size of the issue from $150 million to $300 million. Merrill Lynch, co-manager of the Disney offering perceived an overflow of interest for very-long-maturity bonds. According to Grant Kvalheim, a managing director at Merrill Lynch & Co., "We went to Coke and showed them the (Disney) bonds."7 Three days later Coca-Cola Co. went to market with its own 100-year issue of $150 million. The Coke 100-year bonds were priced to yield 7.455% or just 80 basis point over the benchmark Treasury, but, unlike the Disney bonds, were not callable. The primary buyers of both the Disney and Coca-Cola bonds were large institutions, especially insurance companies and pension funds. There was also speculation that some Wall Street houses would break up the bonds into their component parts and sell the pieces separately. At the end of the week, professionals were still divided over whether the two 100-year bond issues were indicators of a trend and (as Greenspan claimed) evidence of confidence in the economy, or merely two novelty items that enlivened a dull week in July, before everyone headed off on vacation