1.Consider a variation of the Glosten-Milgrom sequential trade model where the asset's value V can take three values. Suppose that the true value of stock in Trident Corporation can be, with equal probability, either , or some middle value V ^M.

Letof the traders be informed insiders, while the remaining 1are uninformed noise traders. Assume as always that informed traders always buy when V = V ^H and sell when V = V ^L, while uninformed traders buy or sell with equal probability.

The focus of this problem is the traders' behavior when V = V ^M.

(a)Draw the tree diagram, leaving uncertain the action of informed traders when V = V ^M.

(b) Show that there is no value of V ^M for which informed traders randomize between buying and selling.

I have done part a. I don't understand what part b is asking. Could you please help with part b?