1.Give a brief exposition of the theory of soul that Aristotle sets out in De Anima II, 1-3. What is a soul, according to Aristotle? How does his conception of the soul compare to Plato's in the Phaedo? Which theory seems more plausible to you, and why?

4. In the Categories (2a34-2 b7), Aristotle argues that if primary substances did not exist, nothing else would exist. What is his argument? (Be sure to explain any technical Aristotelian notions you employ in your elucidation of the argument.) How does the ontology of Aristotle's Categories compare with the ontology of Plato's theory of Forms?

1. Explain Aristotle's account of change in Physics I, 5-9 (esp. Ch. 7). Why, according to Aristotle, must there be three basic "elements" in any case of change? 2. Explain Aristotle's account of change in Physics I, 5-9 (esp. Ch. 7). What difficulties does this account pose for the ontology that Aristotle presented in the Categories?

3. Explain Aristotle's account of change in Physics I, 7-8 and On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be I, 3-4. How does Aristotle deal with Parmenides' claim that "coming into being" is impossible?

4. Parmenides claims that there is no coming-to-be either (a) from "what is not" or (b) from "what is." Aristotle replies that in one sense both of these claims are correct, but in another sense they are both incorrect. Explain what Aristotle means by this, with reference to his account of change and coming-into-being in Physics I, 7-8 and On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be I, 3-4.

5. Aristotle says (a) "there is a science that studies being in so far as it is being" (1003a21). But he also insists (b) "being is spoken of in many ways" (1003a34, 1028a10). (b) seems to mean that 'being' is ambiguous, but if so there does not seem to be any one thing for the science mentioned in (a) to study. So (a) and (b) seem to be inconsistent. How does Aristotle manage to consistently maintain both (a) and (b)?

6. What differences are there between what Aristotle has to say about substances in the Categories and what he (later) says about substances in the Metaphysics? How do you account for these differences.

7. Compare Aristotle's doctrine of primary substance in the Categories with what he says about primary substance in the Metaphysics (cf. esp. 1031a15-18, 1037a5-1037b8, and 1041a6-1041b32). Discuss whatever similarities and differences you find in the two treatments.

8. The concept of matter, which did not appear in the Categories, plays an important role in Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics. What is that role? What difficulties does the concept of matter raise for the doctrine of primary substance that Aristotle presented in the Categories? What does the Metaphysics tell us about primary substance?

9. Explain Aristotle's doctrine (Phys. II, 3) of the four causes (aitia). How might Aristotle reply to Plato's claim (Phaedo 100c-d) that the Form of Beauty is the sole cause (aition) of anything's being beautiful?

The Being of God, as Barth has taught us, is the Being of one who loves in freedom. What we mean by freedom here is essentially love. [Barth writes,] 'The essence of every other being is to be finite, and therefore to have frontiers against the personality of others and to have to guard these frontiers jealously ... It is in its very nature that it cannot affirm itself except by affirming itself against others.' God, on the other hand, is free in that he knows no such limits, that he has no frontiers to guard, and no frontiers to his self-giving. Free self-giving is what love is. Grounded in himself, in an eternal act of self-giving, God has no 'need' of otherness, but his self-giving nevertheless overflows as grace into creation and redemption. The freedom which human beings seek, therefore, in seeking God or transcendence, is not the absence of any constraint (which is as far as many liberal theories of freedom take us - 'free' love and the 'free' market being expressions of the same reductionist anthropology) but the longing for self-possession and self-giving, in short, for the ability to love. The fear of freedom and the quest for this freedom mark every aspect of human experience, and political systems structure both the fear and the quest. T J Gorringe

a. Explainthe conception of freedom discussed in the passage above.

b. EITHER: Is the concept of 'freedom without limits' a coherent one? OR: In what ways may political systems structure the fear of freedom?r