1.Read sections I, II, IV, V, VI and VIII of the IDB document titled 'Financial Regulation in the English-Speaking Caribbean: Is it Helping or Hindering Microfinance?' which is located at http://caribbeanmicrofinancealliance.com/media/docs/14.pdf

2.Do you agree with the stated "...plan of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago to take over the prudential regulation and supervision of credit unions"? Clearly explain your stance using appropriate examples.

Financial Regulation in the English-Speaking Caribbean: Is it Helping or Hindering Microfinance? DISCUSSION PAPER Inter-American Development Bank, 2011 www.iadb.org This paper was developed by consultants, Robert C. Vogel with Gerald Schulz. The information and opinions presented in these publications are entirely those of the author(s), and no endorsement by the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the countries they represent is expressed or implied. Address for correspondence: 1300 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C., 20577. ii Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... iv I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1 II. RISK-BASED SUPERVISION ............................................................................................. 2 III. THE INTERVIEWS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND COVERAGE ................................................... 4 IV. NON-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION .................................................................................... 6 V. DEFINING MICROFINANCE.......................................................................................................... 8 VI. THE CREDIT UNION CHALLENGE..................................................................................... 9 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.9 THE EVOLUTION OF CREDIT UNIONS INTO PROVIDERS OF MICROFINANCE .......................................... 9 REGULATORY CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY CREDIT UNIONS ........................................................... 10 APPROACHES TO CREDIT UNION REGULATION: THE CASE OF TRINIDAD ........................................... 11 IS THE PERFECT THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD? (OR, IF IT ISN'T BROKEN, WHY FIX IT?) ........................... 11 VII. A SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEWS FOCUSED ON PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION .................................................................................................................... 133 7.3 7.13 7.19 7.22 7.24 7.25 7.27 7.28 7.30 7.32 JAMAICA ............................................................................................................................. 13 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO ......................................................................................................... 15 BARBADOS .......................................................................................................................... 17 BELIZE ................................................................................................................................ 18 SURINAME ........................................................................................................................... 19 GUYANA ............................................................................................................................. 19 BAHAMAS ........................................................................................................................... 19 EASTERN CARIBBEAN CENTRAL BANK ........................................................................................ 20 ST. LUCIA ............................................................................................................................ 20 ST. VINCENT ........................................................................................................................ 21 VIII. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................. 21 ANNEX 1: ISSUES REVIEWED WITH REGULATORS ON MICROFINANCE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 26 ANNEX 2: BASEL COMMITTEE'S CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION OF MICROFINANCE 29 ANNEX 3: INFORMAL FINANCE IN THE CARIBBEAN: SOME LESSONS FROM ROSCAS REFERENCES 34 36 iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. This paper presents the results of an investigation requested by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank under its Caribbean Microfinance Capacity Building project (CARIB-CAP)1 to strengthen microfinance in the English-speaking Caribbean. With the financial support of the Compete Caribbean program,2 this report seeks specifically to analyze the extent to which the regulation of financial entities in the region is supporting or inhibiting the development of microfinance in the region. Among the issues considered are the case for regulation, the differences between prudential and non-prudential regulation, the differences in regulatory arrangements among countries in the region, and especially the impact of these regulations on the availability of microfinancial services and on the different types of financial institutions that provide these services. 2. Prudential regulation is seen to deal with the systemic risks that a financial institution can pose if its failure can easily lead to the failure of other financial institutions. The most obvious case, and what largely determines the focus of prudential regulation, is institutions that take deposits from the general public. Non-prudential regulation basically plays a complementary role, dealing mainly with transparency and consumer protection (e.g., standards for accounting and external audits, clear definitions of effective interest rates, rules and mechanisms for dispute resolution, etc). 3. Under risk-based supervision, which is now considered the appropriate approach and endorsed under Basle's Core Principles, the primary role of the supervisory agency is not itself to try to control risks directly but rather to assess the capacity of regulated entities to manage their risks. To do this, the four basic components of an entity's risk management system are assessed: identification of risks; measurement of risks; control of risks; and monitoring of changes in risks and controls. In traditional banking, six risks are seen to account for the vast majority of losses: credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, market risk, interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk. However, for a microfinance institution that is not significantly dependant on foreign funding, the last two risks may be relatively unimportant, while reputational risk, which is not among those listed above, may be quite important. 4. The main activities undertaken for this report were in-depth interviews with the entities providing microfinancial services, especially participants in the CARIB-CAP project, and 1 CARIB-CAP is a US$3 million project co-financed by the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), the European Commission (EC) and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 2 Compete Caribbean is a five- year program for CARICOM countries providing technical assistance grants and investment funding to support productive development policies, business climate reforms, clustering initiatives and Small and Medium Size Enterprise (SME) development activities. The program's estimated value is US$40.0 million, and it is jointly funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the United Kingdom Department of International Development (DFID) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). iv with the various regulatory entities in the region. To standardize this process and to have information as consistent and comparable as possible, two questionnaires were developed, the first one for microfinance entities to capture their views on the state of regulation in their own country and especially its impact on their microfinance activities. This questionnaire was able to rely significantly on the \"Microscope,\" an annual publication that evaluates the environment for microfinance in some 55 countries worldwide. The other questionnaire, for regulatory entities, was developed by the authors of this report and regulatory experts who comprise a broad range of experience (i.e., a highly experienced examiner from the NCUA, a recent retiree from the IMF, and a long-time OCC staff member intimately involved in the development of risk-based supervision). Because of this broadly-based expertise, this questionnaire (see Annex 1), became quite lengthy and was therefore called \"talking points\" so as not to burden high-level regulators excessively. 5. Because of the substantial role, even predominance, of credit unions in the provision of microfinance services in the English-speaking Caribbean, these entities are considered in considerable detail. Further, this importance of credit unions necessitates careful attention to the definition of microfinance, which in turn reveals that some presumed providers of microfinance services are not in fact providers. Thus, the elements that are crucial to understand what is required for sustainable microfinance are explained in detail, in particular that a diversified household and not a single enterprise is being financed, that initial loans are particularly costly because of the need to understand borrower cash flow and character, and that formal collateral is rarely relevant because of the costs of formalization and execution compared to loan size. 6. Before continuing with this discussion, the study's results for non-prudential regulation are considered in some detail. Regulators in the region that cover deposit-taking entities are consistently found to require the main elements of transparency, appropriate standards for accounting and external audits in particular, as well transparency in interest rates. On the other hand, non-deposit-taking entities must have sources other than depositors to supply their external funding (e.g., government agencies, donor entities and private investors), but in the relevant case (Jamaica) funders consistently require such transparency, so that virtually all entities doing microfinance in the Caribbean exhibit these basic elements of transparency, either because of regulatory requirements or incentives related to funding. 7. The situation for interest rate transparency is less clear. While there are clear rules about the need to have unambiguous definitions of effective interest rates (e.g., that include fees and indicate clearly whether interest is charged against the initial balance of the loan or the declining balance), and both regulated and non-regulated entities claim that they conform, in fact it is less clear if borrowers are informed accurately of effective interest rates. Specifically, the inability of some entities, both regulated and non-regulated, to explain correctly how effective interest rates are calculated raises questions about the actual extent of transparency. In addition, in the case of dispute v resolution there are few clear patterns, either with respect to the mechanisms employed (i.e., types of institutions involved or procedures used), or especially the costs incurred and the delays encountered. 8. The remainder of the report turns to a more detailed discussion of some key characteristics of microfinance that are sometimes overlooked and can be especially important for understanding the important challenges facing regulators. Although the term \"microfinance\" comes from a longer phrase, \"microenterprise finance,\" it is in fact not enterprise finance in the way that small and medium enterprise finance is. Economists (and likewise entrepreneurs) often speak of the motive of profit maximization, but for the micro-entrepreneur, the guiding principle is risk minimization for survival. Further, risk minimization implies diversification, which further implies that the micro household will have a number of different sources of cash inflows to survive, which in turn makes it essential for the potential lender to understand the overall cash flows of the micro household. Visiting the potential borrower also creates opportunities to form a judgment of borrower \"character,\" the other key element in micro lending decisions since the costs of formalizing collateral are prohibitive given the small size of a micro loan.3 Furthermore, these costs facing the lender imply that, even with seemingly high interest rates, the initial micro loan will almost certainly be unprofitable, so that borrower retention rates become virtually as important as loan repayment rates in determining ultimate profitability (cf., relationship banking principles). 9. Nonetheless, there are undoubtedly significant numbers of informal lenders throughout the Caribbean (e.g., individuals, pawn shops, merchants that lend to facilitate their sales, etc.), as well as financial self-help groups such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) that may compete with formal micro lenders. 10. The over-riding importance of credit unions in the provision of microfinancial services in the region, especially outside of Jamaica, necessitates analyzing them more fully with respect to both their regulation and their approach to microfinance. 4 Historically, most of the important credit unions in the English-speaking Caribbean were employer based, but more recently many of these have begun to allow immediate family of a member also to become members, and typically this soon expanded to more distant relatives. With respect to microfinance, the latest step in broadening - allowing the self-employed to become members - has been the most important. With an employer bond, lending is typically like consumer or personal lending, with payroll deductions being the favored means of repayment. With self-employed members, there is a true revolution in lending as payroll deductions are no longer relevant for that segment of the credit union 3 In comparison, the costs to a lender of analyzing the essential aspects of a small or medium enterprise itself are much greater and far more important given the far less diversified nature of a small or medium entrepreneur. 4 In fact, outside of Jamaica only Microfin could be found, in Trinidad and with affiliates in two of the Eastern Caribbean countries - and in all three cases with sustainability seriously in doubt. vi membership, presenting both a challenge and also the opportunity of doing true micro lending. In fact, in some of the credit unions surveyed the self-employed have grown to account for half or more the membership of the credit union. 11. With significant lending to the self-employed, credit union regulators must effectively take into account a wider range of risk-related challenges that come more strongly into play (e.g., credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, etc.). Furthermore, in many countries credit unions are lumped together with other types of cooperatives for supervisory purposes, and, in addition, because of cooperatives' social motivation, regulatory responsibilities are often extended beyond supervision to promotion. This, of course, can easily create conflicts of interest between regulation and promotion. Finally, to complicate further the burden placed on regulatory agencies, some countries have large numbers of very small credit unions, which of course are costly to supervise effectively. The following sections of the report examine in detail how the responses to these regulatory challenges have evolved in three of the main CARIB-CAP countries - including especially the implications for microfinance.5 12. While the Cooperative Credit Union League of Trinidad and Tobago does not explicitly favor self-regulation, it does strongly favor continuation of the current regime (albeit with increased resources for the current regulatory agency) - a regime that does support, at least implicitly, the League's views that promotion should be combined with regulation, that all types of cooperatives should be dealt with in a single agency and, most problematic of all, that multi-purpose cooperatives should be allowed, if not encouraged, at the behest of credit union members. However, Central Bank officials indicate that, while no official change has yet been made, one is currently in process that would specifically bring credit union regulation under the Central Bank. 13. In Jamaica, the League is the current regulatory entity (delegated self regulation), but here the League presents clear indications of both its technical capacity and its willingness to carry out regulation and supervision effectively and independently. The League carries on off-site surveillance using PEARLS and other WOCCU principles, with on-site inspections at least every other year (and more often if monitoring indicates risks that need to be addressed). While Central Bank officials indicate that credit unions are a significant part of Jamaica's financial system, they also state that they are not aware that credit unions are significantly involved in microfinance. Furthermore, since commercial banks are not involved in microfinance, the Central Bank does not have special procedures to evaluate such lending and its risks. While recognizing that for practical reasons micro loans may not be secured (no formal collateral), Central Bank official are not considering any special limits higher than the 10 percent allowed for 5 In fact, much of CARIB-CAP's work has focused on helping credit unions to develop pilot microfinance programs, as can be see seen in the various CARIB-CAP reports listed in the references. In fact, the majority of CARIB-CAP technical assistance activities have been with credit unions. vii unsecured loans by commercial banks. Minimum capital requirements for credit unions are also of major concern in two respects: (1) what would actually count as capital (under what conditions would member shares count);6 and (2) the initial minimum capital requirements being proposed would effectively prevent the start-up of new credit unions to the detriment of relatively disadvantaged member of Jamaican society. 14. While prudential regulation and supervision could be improved in various aspects in the countries surveyed, there may be other reasons that the CARIB-CAP project has only recently begun to have a significant impact on microfinance in the English-speaking Caribbean. Although it may be important to consider what other barriers there might be and what needs to be done to identify them and possibly remedy them, this is not the primary focus of the present report. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that microfinance prospers most where economies of scale can be achieved, and this can represent a potentially difficult challenge for the small countries of the English-speaking Caribbean.7 Another possibility is that \"informal\" finance of various types is supplying the demands for financial services coming from micro-entrepreneurs. However, the only interesting example of informal finance that has been studied and appears to be fairly widespread in the English-speaking Caribbean is the ROSCA, but ROSCAs are focused on accumulating savings, rather than lending, and are often seen as having the same motivations and incentive structures as the already-present credit unions. 15. While little can be done to deal with the lack of economies of scale in small Caribbean island countries, it might be worthwhile to investigate informal finance in the region to see what niches it is filling and what lessons it can provide. However, this study's main recommendations for the future are focused on regulatory issues. First, it is crucial to monitor the extent to which risk-based supervision is in fact being effectively implemented. This is not a minor challenge given the ever-present temptation to rely on the easier approach of focusing on the presence of formal collateral, which is of course largely irrelevant for microfinance. There are also two current controversies whose outcomes warrant careful monitoring: (1) the plan of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago to take over the prudential regulation and supervision of credit unions, which is being opposed by the Credit Union League there and some of its credit unions; and (2) the on-going efforts of the Jamaica's Central Bank to take over the regulation and supervision of credit unions and to impose potentially inappropriate requirements for capital and formal collateral. In addition, in Barbados the prudential regulation and supervision of credit unions has recently passed to a newly created Financial Services Commission, and similar arrangements are in place in various Eastern Caribbean countries, all of which may require monitoring and possible interventions to help accomplish the objectives of microfinance under risk-based supervision. 6 7 See WOCCU's publication in the references for a complete discussion of this issue. The fact that Jamaica has done relatively well may tend to confirm this suspicion. viii Financial Regulation in the English-Speaking Caribbean: Is it Helping or Hindering Microfinance? Robert C. Vogel with Gerald Schulz8 I. INTRODUCTION 1.1 This paper presents the results of an investigation requested by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank under its Caribbean Microfinance Capacity Building project (CARIB-CAP)9 to strengthen microfinance in the English-speaking Caribbean. With the financial support of the Compete Caribbean program10 this report seeks specifically to analyze the extent to which the regulation of financial entities in the region is supporting or inhibiting the development of microfinance in the English-speaking Caribbean. Among the issues to be considered are the cases for regulation, the differences between prudential and non-prudential regulation, the viability of self-regulation, the different regulatory arrangements in the English-speaking Caribbean, and especially their impact on the availability of microfinancial services and on different types of financial institutions that provide these services. 1.2 To begin, it is crucial to understand the difference between prudential and nonprudential regulation and to appreciate the overriding importance of prudential regulation while not neglecting non-prudential regulation. To differentiate, a standard approach has been taken, that is, prudential regulation is seen to deal with the systemic risks that a financial institution can pose if its failure can easily lead to the failure of other financial institutions. The most obvious case, and what largely determines the 8 The authors would like to thank profusely the many individuals and institutions that have assisted in making this study possible, including not only the various credit unions and other microfinance entities and their regulators who gave their time to be interviewed, but also the IADB staff who helped greatly in providing guidance on key issues and contacts for the various interviews. However, none of these is responsible for any errors or questionable interpretations made by the authors. 9 CARIB-CAP is a US$3 million project co-financed by the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), the European Commission (EC) and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 10 Compete Caribbean is a five year program for CARICOM countries providing technical assistance grants and investment funding to support productive development policies, business climate reforms, clustering initiatives and Small and Medium Size Enterprise (SME) development activities. The program's estimated value is US$40.0 million, and it is jointly funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the United Kingdom Department of International Development (DFID) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 1 focus of prudential regulation, is institutions that take deposits from the general public, as the failure of a deposit-taking institution can spread dramatically to otherwise sound institutions if depositors' fears based on the initial failure engender \"runs,\" with depositors rushing everywhere to turn their deposits into cash. Prudential regulation is also seen as protecting depositors who are generally believed to be poorly informed about the potential risks that a deposit-taking institution may face.11 Non-prudential regulation basically plays a complementary role, dealing mainly with transparency and consumer protection (e.g., standards for accounting and external audits, clear definitions of effective interest rates, rules and mechanisms for dispute resolution, etc). 1.3 The next section of this report provides an introduction to the essential elements of riskbased supervision in order to understand the importance of its application to the regulation of microfinance. The following two sections describe the development of the questionnaires, one for the providers of microfinancial services and the other for the regulators, followed by an outline of the interview process, noting the particular importance of credit unions. The next section briefly describes the basic elements of non-prudential regulation, while the following section explains the essential elements of microfinance, carefully differentiating it from lending to small and medium enterprises. 1.4 The following five sections are in some ways the heart of the report and are devoted to credit unions as the main providers of microfinancial services in the English-speaking Caribbean, first analyzing their essential characteristics, then following their evolution into providers of microfinancial services, and finally emphasizing the challenges they present for regulation with detailed discussions of the experiences of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. After a description of the interviews themselves as they pertain directly to prudential regulation and supervision, the body of the report ends with a summary of the main findings and conclusions, followed by three annexes.12 II. RISK-BASED SUPERVISION 2.1 Given the obvious overriding importance of focusing on risk for effective prudential regulation, it is somewhat surprising that risk-based supervision did not come to the fore earlier, but it is now clearly the accepted basis for implementing prudential regulation. Perhaps the earliest paper discussing risk-based supervision for developing countries (published in 2000), although not directed specifically toward microfinance, 11 Prudential regulation is often combined with deposit insurance to protect these unwary depositors and inhibit runs, but deposit insurance without effective prudential regulation is a \"recipe for disaster,\" as no one will be monitoring the risks of deposit-taking institutions. 12 Annex 1 - Issues Reviewed with Regulators on Microfinance Regulation and Supervision; Annex 2 - Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Supervision of Microfinance; and Annex 3 - Informal Finance in the Caribbean Lessons from ROSCAs. 2 provides a useful summary of the key elements of the risk-based approach as well as tracing its development, comparing it with traditional approaches to supervision, and noting its adoption as underlying Basle's Core Principles.13 2.2 An overriding theme of this paper is that the primary role of the supervisory agency is not itself to try to control risks directly but rather to assess the capacity of regulated entities to manage their risks. To do this, the four basic components of an entity's risk management system are assessed: identification of risks; measurement of risks; control of risks; and monitoring of changes in risks and controls. In traditional banking, six risks are seen to account for the vast majority of losses: credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, market risk, interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk. However, for a microfinance institution that is not significantly dependent on foreign funding, the last two risks may be relatively unimportant, while reputational risk, which is not among those listed above, may be quite important. 2.3 About the same time as the paper referenced above was published, case studies were carried out in three developing countries that have been among the pioneers in microfinance (Bolivia, Peru and the Philippines) on an appropriate application of riskbased supervision specifically to microfinance.14 With growing interest in microfinance and best practice approaches to its regulation and supervision, these early cases studies have been largely superseded by recent publications sponsored by leading international agencies: Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas, \"Guidelines of Principles for Effective Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Operations,\" 2010; Consultative Group for the Poorest (CGAP), \"Microfinance Consensus Guidelines: A Guide to Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance,\" April 2011; and World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), \"Model Regulations for Credit Unions,\" February 2008. 2.4 In addition, Annex 2 of this report provides a summary version of the Basle Committee's Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision of Microfinance Activities. One area that these publications do not discuss in any great detail, but which can be a major issue for Caribbean entities that provide microfinancial services, is what institution will in fact be responsible for regulation and carrying out supervision functions. Despite general skepticism about self-regulation and delegated supervision, it appears that under some 13 Thomas Fitzgerald and Robert Vogel, \"Moving Towards Risk-Based Supervision in Developing Economies,\" Harvard Institute for International Development, CAER Discussion Paper No. 66, May 2000. The adoption of riskbased supervision by Basle is perhaps a \"mixed blessing,\" as regulators worldwide now claim to be using risk-based supervision whether or not they understand what is required for its implementation. 14 Arelis Gomez, German Tabares and Robert Vogel, \"Microfinance, Bank Regulation and Supervision: The Bolivian Case Study,\" US Agency for International Development, August 2000; Arelis Gomez, Thomas Fitzgerald and Robert Vogel, \"Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Activities: The Philippine Case Study,\" US Agency for International Development, November 2000; and Thomas Fitzgerald and Robert Vogel, \"Proposed Framework for the Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Institutions in Peru,\" Inter-American Development Bank, December 2001. 3 circumstances in the Caribbean such alternatives deserve careful consideration. III. THE INTERVIEWS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND COVERAGE 3.1 With this background of views and experiences on the regulation and supervision of microfinance, the major activity undertaken for this report was in-depth interviews with the entities providing microfinancial services, especially participants in the CARIB-CAP project, and with the various regulatory entities in the region. To standardize this process and to have information as consistent and comparable as possible, two questionnaires were developed, the first one for microfinance entities to capture their views on the state of regulation in their own country and especially its impact on their microfinance activities. 3.2 This questionnaire had the good fortune to be able to rely significantly on the \"Microscope.\"15 This is an annual publication of the Economist Group (supported by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group, the Development Bank of Latin America and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands), available on-line and in print, which rates the environment for microfinance in 55 countries from all regions of the world. This rating is based on ten criteria, five of which relate to the country's regulatory framework and practices and the other five to its supporting institutional framework.16 Two countries from the English-speaking Caribbean are included in the Microscope's coverage, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, but unfortunately both of these rank among the lowest in the world in regulatory aspects and only slightly better in institutional support.17 3.3 The other questionnaire, for regulatory entities, was developed by the principal author of this report and three regulatory experts who comprise a broad range of experience (i.e., a highly experienced examiner from the NCUA, a recent retiree from the IMF, and a long-time OCC staff member intimately involved in the development of risk-based 15 Economist Intelligence Unit, \"Global Microscope on the Microfinance Business Environment, 2011\" 16 The five Regulatory Framework and Practices indicators are: (1) Regulation and supervision of microcredit portfolios; (2) Formation of regulated/supervised microcredit institutions; (3) Formation/operation of nonregulated microcredit institutions; (4) Regulatory and supervisory capacity for microfinance; and (5) Regulatory framework for deposit-taking. The five indicators for the Supporting Institutional Framework are: (1) Accounting transparency; (2) Client protection -- Transparency in pricing; (3) Client Protection -- Dispute resolution; (4) Credit bureaus; and (5) Policy and practice for financial transactions through agents. 17 The Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) also provides important information on microfinance based on data reported voluntarily by microfinance institutions from around the world, several hundred of them, with some of these data now being incorporated into the \"Microscope.\" Of all the microfinance entities in the Englishspeaking Caribbean only about six have been reporting to the MIX in recent years. 4 supervision). Because of this broadly-based expertise, this questionnaire, found as Annex 1, became quite lengthy and was therefore called \"talking points\" so as not to burden high-level regulators excessively. In addition, as already indicated, key documents concerning the regulation of microfinance have been reviewed for their applicability to the present study of microfinance in the English-speaking Caribbean (see reports listed at the end of this study, especially those by CGAP, WOCCU and the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas, as well as Annex 2, a summary of Basle's views on risks). 3.4 The countries to be covered in the surveys include members of the IADB with financial institutions participating in the CARIB-CAP project, that is, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, plus countries that are members of the OECS, and thus not members of the IADB, but nonetheless participate fully in the project (i.e., Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines). The microfinance institutions that could have participated in the survey for this study number about thirty, of which about half are credit unions, the other half being various types of microfinance entities, including both for-profit and non-profit, as well as several government development banks. 3.5 In addition, interviews were carried out with the appropriate regulatory agencies in each country as well as supporting institutions such as associations of credit unions or of microfinance institutions where these existed. The preponderance of interviews in Jamaica, followed by Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, suggests the relative importance of microfinance in each of the countries, while the types of institutions involved and their relative importance can also be inferred from the list of those interviewed.18 3.6 With respect to the interviews using these questionnaires, the first ones were carried out from IADB headquarters in Washington through video and phone conferencing in order to test the questionnaires' effectiveness before traveling and to cover the Caribbean countries that would not be visited in person (i.e., Belize, Guyana, Suriname and the Bahamas) because of the time and costs potentially involved. The first country to be visited was Jamaica, to which most of a week was devoted because of the large number of CARIB-CAP participant entities and the variety of regulatory entities to be interviewed. 3.7 This was followed by an extended visit to the remaining countries, beginning with three days in Barbados, followed by one or two days each in St. Lucia and St. Vincent, and ending with three days in Trinidad.19 The Trinidad visit also required follow-up phone 19 The situation for the Eastern Caribbean country visits was complicated by two aspects: (1) the primary regulatory entity, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, was not visited but was rather dealt with by an interview in St. Vincent and a subsequent telephone conference; and (2) Grenada was not visited in spite of having four actual or potential CARIB-CAP participants because three of the four never responded to e-mails requesting meetings, 5 conferences to interview the two credit unions that had initially been scheduled but could not be visited in person, because one credit union was located too far away and, for the other, the key person to be interviewed was out of the country. Moreover, these interviews had become particularly important because of major differences in the views in Trinidad on how credit unions should be regulated. 3.8 Because of the substantial role, even predominance, of credit unions in the provision of microfinance services in the English-speaking Caribbean, these entities are considered below in considerable detail. Further, this importance of credit unions necessitates careful attention to the definition of microfinance, which in turn reveals that some presumed providers of microfinance services are not in fact providers, although in one case these entities are attacking a very challenging task, while in another they may potentially be undermining sustainable microfinance. 3.9 Further elements that are crucial to understand what is required for sustainable microfinance are then dealt with, specifically that a diversified household and not a single enterprise is being financed, that initial loans are particularly costly because of the need to understand borrower cash flow and character, and that formal collateral is rarely relevant because of the costs of formalization and execution compared to loan size. Before moving on to discuss these characteristics of microfinance and the role of credit unions in greater detail, and then to present detailed results of the interviews undertaken in the various Caribbean countries, a brief discussion of non-prudential regulation is presented. IV. NON-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 4.1 While much of this study focuses on the role and implementation of prudential regulation with its objectives of protecting unsophisticated depositors and especially curtailing the potential spread of systemic risks, non-prudential regulation also has significant roles to play. As already indicated, non-prudential regulation deals mainly with transparency and consumer protection and, in fact, provides some interesting lessons, especially with respect to incentives.20 One important element of transparency is the implementation of recognized accounting standards, the use of qualified external auditors with clear mandates to produce appropriately audited financial statements, and the appropriate availability of financial statements, especially audited ones. In the Caribbean this has been well taken care of for interesting reasons. Whatever their shortcomings may be, regulators covering deposit-taking entities have consistently required these elements of transparency. On the other hand, non-deposit-taking entities require sources other than depositors to supply their external funding (e.g., 4.2 while the fourth responded only during travel to the Caribbean when it was too late to change the itinerary. 20 Anti Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Client (KYC) might also be considered non-prudential regulations, but they are not considered for this study. 6 government agencies, donor entities and private investors), and these funders have consistently required similar transparency. Thus, virtually all entities doing microfinance in the Caribbean exhibit such transparency, either because of regulatory requirements or incentives related to funding. 4.3 With respect to the other elements of non-prudential regulation, those dealing primarily with consumer protection (e.g., clear and consistent definitions of effective interest rates and mechanisms for dispute resolution that are reasonably rapid and low cost), the situation is much less clear, and the situation again involves incentives. Most regulatory agencies have clear rules about the need to have unambiguous definitions of effective interest rates (e.g., that include fees and indicate clearly whether interest is charged against the initial balance of the loan or the declining balance). 4.4 Not surprisingly, regulated entities all indicate that they conform, but they often express serious doubts about whether entities that are not prudentially regulated in fact inform borrowers of effective interest rates. For the most part, however, non-regulated entities also indicate that they inform borrowers of the effective interest rates being charged. Nonetheless, the inability of some entities, both regulated and non-regulated, to explain correctly how effective interest rates are calculated raises questions about the actual extent of transparency. Furthermore, many lenders report that borrowers have little or no concern with effective interest rates and instead focus their attention on the amount of interest to be paid. In fact, this may be the relevant decision variable for many borrowers as they are more concerned about the total cost of a loan, including the transaction costs involved in obtaining and repaying a loan, as well as the interest.21 Resulting borrower lack of attention to effective interest rates may make efforts focused on interest rate transparency less useful than generally supposed. 4.5 The findings for dispute resolution are in many ways even more diverse, except in the case of credit unions where committees of credit union members (e.g., the vigilance or audit committee) are an explicit part of credit union structure to deal with disputes, along with various other issues. However, for other types of entities, and across the different Caribbean countries, there are few clear patterns with respect to mechanisms for dispute resolution and their effectiveness. Furthermore, these differences are not due simply to the different types of institutions involved or the procedures used, but more importantly to the costs incurred and delays encountered. 21 In the 1970s and 1980s small farmers were often called stupid for their focus on amounts of interest to be paid rather than effective interest rates, but in that era of heavily subsidized interest rates for agricultural credit the amount of interest to be paid needed to be compared with the transaction costs that would be incurred, especially in obtaining the loan. 7 V. DEFINING MICROFINANCE 5.1 Two other types of entities in the Caribbean that presume to be doing microfinance also need to be mentioned, although neither is in fact doing microfinance. The first, the Barbados Youth Business Trust, with companion entities in various other Caribbean countries (e.g., Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago), as well as in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world, is making significant efforts to help disadvantaged youths become entrepreneurs. However beneficial this may be, it is not in fact microfinance because it violates two of the cardinal rules of successful microfinance: (1) do not finance start-ups; and (2) do not \"package\" substantial amounts of training and technical assistance with financing. Furthermore, the Barbados Youth Business Trust (and presumably its siblings as well) requires substantial amounts of donated funds to stay afloat. 5.2 The other set of entities is the government development banks that can be found in virtually every one of the Caribbean countries (e.g., Fund Access in Barbados, the National Entrepreneurship Development Company in Trinidad, and the St. Lucia Development Bank in St. Lucia). This set of entities could in fact present problems for microfinance in that they offer interest rates far below market and thus could crowd out legitimate microfinance entities and enable an environment of rent seeking, but in fact they have only very limited funding. 5.3 Having said this, it is useful to point out a few key characteristics of microfinance that are sometimes overlooked and can be especially important in order to understand some of the challenges facing regulators. Although the term \"microfinance\" comes from a longer phrase, \"microenterprise finance,\" it is in fact not enterprise finance in the way that small and medium enterprise finance is. Economists (and likewise entrepreneurs) often speak of the motive of profit maximization, but for the micro-entrepreneur, the guiding principle is risk minimization for survival. 5.4 Further, risk minimization implies diversification, which further implies that the micro household will have a number of different sources of cash inflows to survive, which in turn makes it essential for the potential lender to understand the overall cash flows of the micro household. Indeed, lenders typically complain of the time and effort that they must spend with the micro household in creating a detailed picture of all the cash flows in order to know how much they can lend and how to structure the loan (e.g., its repayment schedule). Of course, visiting the potential borrower creates opportunities to form a judgment of borrower \"character,\" which is the other key element in micro lending decisions since the costs of formalizing collateral are prohibitive given the small size of a micro loan.22 Furthermore, these costs facing the lender imply that, even with 22 In comparison, the costs to a lender of analyzing the essential aspects of a small or medium enterprise itself are much greater and far more important given the far less diversified nature of a small or medium entrepreneur. 8 seemingly very high interest rates, the initial micro loan will almost certainly be unprofitable, so that borrower retention rates become virtually as important as loan repayment rates in determining ultimate profitability (cf., relationship banking principles). VI. THE CREDIT UNION CHALLENGE 6.1 Credit unions are both the good news and the bad news for microfinance in the Caribbean. They are the good news in that they have a long-standing presence in the English-speaking Caribbean and are clearly the main entities serving the non-affluent in the Caribbean, that is, those tending to fall below the reach of the commercial banking sector. They are the bad news in that virtually everywhere, especially outside the more developed countries, they present serious challenges to regulators - challenges that in fact go beyond those presented by microfinance23 - and in the Caribbean they may actually have crowded out other potential providers of microfinancial services, especially in the smaller countries. 6.2 Indeed, other providers of microfinancial services are quite hard to find, except in Jamaica where virtually all of CARIB-CAP's MFI participants can be found.24 As in most parts of the world, commercial banks in the Caribbean have largely stayed away from microfinance, except perhaps for some slight incursions by Scotia Bank25 in its efforts to serve the small and medium enterprise sector, and perhaps in the near future by Baroda Bank, a recent arrival in Trinidad from India. Indeed, MFIs are quite hard to find in the Caribbean, notwithstanding a thorough search of the countries formally participating in the CARIB-CAP project as well as several of the Eastern Caribbean countries. In fact, outside of Jamaica only Microfin could be found, in Trinidad and with affiliates in two of the Eastern Caribbean countries - and in all three cases with sustainability seriously in doubt. Nonetheless, there are undoubtedly significant numbers of informal lenders throughout the Caribbean (e.g., individuals, pawn shops, merchants that lend to facilitate their sales, etc.), as well as financial self-help groups such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). 6.3 The Evolution of Credit Unions into Providers of Microfinance: An interesting feature of Caribbean credit unions that has made them potentially important players in 23 These challenges will become evident in the immediately following sections of this report that discuss credit unions in the Caribbean in considerable detail. For regulators, perhaps the greatest challenges relate to the effective use of risk-based supervision and avoiding the easier path of implementing arbitrary rules and ratios. 24 Several of Jamaica's MFIs are discussed later in detail. 25 Scotia had earlier established Microenterprise Financing Limited (MEFL) in Jamaica, which was later closed, but has recently announced the establishment of a new microfinance subsidiary there. 9 microfinance has been their evolution, especially in recent years, in the type of bond (the affinity group) that is used to define credit union membership. Most of the larger and more important credit unions in the Caribbean have typically had an employer bond, that is, members of the credit union were limited to the employees of a particular employer (which could even be teachers or other government employees). However, that typically limited the growth of the credit union, especially in membership, and might even result in decline if the employer ran into problems or even just stagnated. So, employer based credit unions often began to allow the immediate family of a member also to become members of the credit union, and typically this was soon expanded to more distant relatives. 6.4 With respect to microfinance, the latest step in broadening has been the most important - allowing the self-employed to become members of the credit union. With an employer bond, lending is typically like consumer or personal lending, with payroll deductions being the favored means of repayment. With self-employed members there is a true revolution in lending as payroll deductions are no longer relevant for that segment of the credit union membership, presenting both a challenge and also the opportunity of doing true micro lending. In fact, in some of the credit unions surveyed the self-employed have grown to account for half the membership of the credit union.26 6.5 Regulatory Challenges Presented by Credit Unions: When a credit union opens to the self-employed, the nature of the risks that must be taken into account by the credit union regulator change dramatically. For a credit union with a strictly limited employer bond, the major risk lies in fact with the employer (a fact that is often overlooked, but which in several cases in the Caribbean is what has led to opening up the member bond definition). However, with significant lending to the self-employed, a wider range of risk-related challenges come more strongly into play (e.g., credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, etc.), which a regulator must effectively take into account - even a regulator that is not fully \"in to\" risk-based supervision.27 6.6 Moreover, credit union regulatory agencies also often face a further problem, one that is most prominent in Trinidad among the Caribbean countries, but is typical throughout Latin America and much of the rest of the developing world - large numbers of very small credit unions, which of course are costly to supervise effectively. Furthermore, in 26 Much of CARIB-CAP's work has focused on helping credit unions to develop pilot microfinance programs, as can be see seen in the various CARIB-CAP reports listed in the references. In fact, the majority of CARIB-CAP technical assistance activities have been with credit unions. 27 One unfortunate side effect of Basle's adoption of risk-based supervision as the norm is that all regulatory agencies now say that they have fully adopted risk-based supervision whether or not they understand the basic principles of risk-based supervision or have attempted to implement them. See Annex 4 for a complete summary of Basle's interpretation of risk-based supervision with respect to how each risk applies to microfinance. What also needs to be emphasized is that the regulator is not supposed to manage risks for the regulated institution (e.g., by arbitrarily imposing various ratios) but rather to evaluate the ability of the regulated entity to manage its risks. 10 many countries credit unions are lumped together with other types of cooperatives, and regulatory responsibilities may even extend beyond supervision to promotion, which of course creates potential conflicts of interest between these two responsibilities. 6.7 Approaches to Credit Union Regulation: the Case of Trinidad: As discussed in detail later in this paper, Trinidad is a prime example of both these problems, as the Cooperative Development Division in the Ministry of Labor and Small and Micro Enterprise Development is responsible not only for over 100 credit unions but also for over 100 cooperatives of other types, and with a mandate to promote as well as supervise. Furthermore, multi-purpose cooperatives seem to be firmly entrenched in Trinidad, as the Cooperative Development Division not only allows them but the Credit Union League argues that credit unions should be allowed to undertake whatever other activities their members want. 6.8 Most regulatory experts argue against a self-regulatory approach, noting especially the potential conflicts of interest involved as well as a lack of the necessary technical expertise. Trinidad appears to be an example that tends to confirm such apprehension. While the Cooperative Credit Union League of Trinidad and Tobago does not explicitly favor self-regulation, it does strongly favor continuation of the current regime (albeit with increased resources for the current regulatory agency) - a regime that does support, at least implicitly, the League's views that promotion should be combined with regulation, that all types of cooperatives should be dealt with in a single agency and, most problematic of all, that multi-purpose cooperatives should be allowed, if not encouraged, at the behest of credit union members. Nonetheless, Central Bank officials indicate that, while no official change has yet been made, one is currently in process that would specifically bring credit unions under the Central Bank. A draft of the proposed changes indicates a transfer of only \"financial\" regulation and supervision (understood to mean prudential) to the Central Bank, leaving other aspects (e.g., promotion) to the Cooperative Development Division in the Labor Ministry. While the League strongly opposes such a change (and argues that most credit unions favor the League's view), the Central Bank's response to the \"Questionnaire for Regulators\" presents an image of this Central Bank as fully cognizant of the challenges presented by the prudential regulation of credit unions and their microfinance activities. 6.9 Is the Perfect the Enemy of the Good? (Or, if it isn't broken, why fix it?): Quite a different situation appears to prevail in Jamaica, although there is the same basic conflict as in Trinidad between the Central Bank and Jamaica's Co-operative Credit Union League concerning regulation. In Jamaica, the League is the current regulatory entity (delegated self regulation), but here the League presents clear indications of both its technical capacity and its willingness to carry out regulation and supervision effectively and independently. For example, the League has both a deposit insurance fund and a stabilization fund, both of which operate on best-practice principles of first putting problematic credit unions under supervision and, if required, ultimately merging them with stronger ones rather than going to liquidation. Furthermore, the League 11 carries on off-site surveillance using PEARLS and other WOCCU principles, with on-site inspections at least every other year (and more often if monitoring indicates risks that need to be addressed).28 The League is also aware of the special characteristics of microfinance and encourages credit unions to be flexible with respect to collateral and to charge interest rates sufficient to cover costs and risks. In 2007, when moving credit union regulation to the Central Bank began to be discussed, the League suspended its on-site inspections but retained its inspectors to provide technical assistance to credit unions.29 6.10 While the Central Bank of Jamaica indicates that credit unions are a significant part of Jamaica's financial system, the officials interviewed stated that they are unaware that credit unions are involved significantly in microfinance and, further, that as commercial banks are not involved in microfinance, the Central Bank does not have any special procedures to evaluate such lending and its risks. While recognizing that for practical reasons micro loans may not be secured (no formal collateral), the Central Bank is not considering any special limits for unsecured loans higher than the 10 percent limit set for commercial banks. Strongly opposed by the League, not only could this 10 percent limit be problematic for micro lending, but it could also be problematic for credit unions' widespread use of payroll deductions for repayment rather than formal collateral. 6.11 In addition to this specific point of conflict, minimum capital requirements are of further major concern for the League in two respects: (1) what would actually count as capital (under what conditions member shares should be counted);30 and (2) that the initial minimum capital requirements being proposed would effectively prevent the start-up of new credit unions to the detriment of relatively disadvantaged member of Jamaican society. Furthermore, while Jamaican Central Bank officials are likely aware of the very large numbers of small credit unions in Trinidad that are relatively expensive to supervise, they do not appear to be considering exempting very small credit unions in Jamaica from Central Bank regulation and supervision.31 28 Regulatory powers have long been delegated to the League by the Registrar of Cooperatives in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to which the League reports its findings (as well as to the Central Bank). The League also requires appropriately standardized accounting and is particularly concerned to assure that required annual audits are carried out by well-qualified auditors operating under appropriate mandates. 29 The Central Bank also carries out some inspections of credit unions but does not share the information obtained with either the credit union or the League, although it does sometimes indicate specific concerns to the League. 30 See WOCCU's publication in the references for a complete discussion of this issue. 31 It is interesting to note that, while the \"fit and proper\" requirements potentially being initiated for credit union officials in Trinidad is strongly opposed by the League there as a contradiction of credit union adherence to voluntarism, this does not appear to be an issue of similar concern to the League in Jamaica. 12 VII. A SUMMARY OF THE INTERVIEWS FOCUSED ON PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 7.1 The following section of this report presents a summary of the meetings held with officials of entities in the English-speaking Caribbean involved in microfinance, either directly as providers of microfinancial services or as concerned participants, especially those involved in various ways in the regulation and supervision of microfinance. This summary focuses in particular on how the regulation and supervision of microfinance is carried out in the different countries and how different types of entities are dealt with, including especially the issues and controversies that have arisen. 7.2 Needless to say, the findings from these interviews provide the primary inputs on which the preceding sections of the report are based. In this summary the largest countries are discussed first, which are coincidentally the ones with the greatest controversies, followed by the countries that were handled by video and phone conferences, and concluding with those from the Eastern Caribbean. 7.3 Jamaica: With respect to microfinance interest rates, there is an official limit on interest rates of slightly over 20 percent per year (exactly how much over 20 percent varied among the respondents, perhaps largely because it did not apply to any of them), but to be exempted from this limit it is only necessary to apply to the Ministry of Finance under the Money Lenders Act and to supply the Ministry with some basic information. MFIs state that approval by the Ministry is essentially automatic (although one MFI mentioned that it is also required to report to the Bank of Jamaica because it is part of a regulated financial conglomerate). With that approval there is said to be no official limit, but there is a norm for interest rates of 1 percent per week. In this process the Ministry of Finance plays a significant role not only as the agency to which MFIs apply but also because of its focus on transparency, requiring MFIs to supply their articles of incorporation, audited financial statements and further information about the types of loans made and their specific terms and conditions.32 7.4 One respect in which Jamaica's MFIs are all the same is that none of them takes deposits, being funded instead by the donor contributions, by private investors seeking profits, by their retained earnings and, of particular interest, by government credit lines. While these credit lines come from a variety of government sources and with a variety of conditions, including some interest rate limitations, these do not appear to be highly distortionary. Moreover, because these MFIs do not capture deposits, they are not subject to strict prudential regulation and supervision. 32 Ministry of Finance also plays a major role in that it sets overall financial sector policies for Jamaica. 13 7.5 Nonetheless, their funding from government agencies provides an opportunity to impose conditions on these MFIs that can promote transparency and other \"good practices\" that may enhance their long-run sustainability. In this, the Development Bank of Jamaica plays a highly important role, not only in providing funding for MFIs but also in promoting their transparency. Specifically, it requires audited financial statements and also promotes a maximum interest rate of 1 percent per week for micro loans. In addition, its evaluation of its MFI clients focuses on arrearages in micro loans and requires strict provisioning for overdue loans. 7.6 On the other hand, in its evaluations collateral does not need to be \"formal,\" and it even offers loan guarantees (up to 50 percent) for loans without collateral. Furthermore, the Development Bank provides funding for credit unions under the same set of rules, and, in spite of the Bank of Jamaica's position, its officials favor continued self regulation of credit unions by the Credit Union League because of the League's intimate knowledge of credit union operations, its careful oversight of these operations and its effective use of its stabilization fund to insure that credit union problems are dealt with quickly and effectively. 7.7 Bank of Jamaica officials devoted particular attention to the importance of credit unions in Jamaica's financial system, which is the perhaps the main basis for their intention to take over the regulation and supervision of credit unions. At the same time, they note that the Bank has no particular interest in microfinance as it does not regulate MFIs because they do not take deposits, while the banks that it does regulate play no role in microfinance. Bank officials thus indicate that they have no examination procedures specifically for microfinance and seemed surprised when told that credit unions are significantly involved in microfinance. 7.8 Involvement in microfinance is of course just one of the reasons for credit union concerns with the Bank's proposed low limits on unsecured lending as a proportion of loan portfolios. Equally serious is the concern with minimum capital requirements, seen as potentially preventing the formation of new credit unions, and how the Bank might measure capital, specifically members' shares, which Bank officials think may or may not be permanent. On the other hand, the Bank's policy of provisioning only after loans become 90 days delinquent is far too generous for micro loans. 7.9 Co-operative Credit Union League (CUL) officials outlined the main services provided by the League, but focused primarily on the proposed transfer of responsibilities for credit union regulation and supervision to the Bank of Jamaica. Officials noted that the League does mu