2. [12 points) Consider a. rstprice auction with two bidders and independent primate Tralues. Assume both bidders' Tvaluations1 1:1 and 113, are uniformly distributed on the interval [I], 1]. Each biddersT payoit is vi bi if b,- is the highest bid and I] otherwise. Recall that each bidder's strategyr is a mapping from their primate information to their bid. {a} Suppose bidder 1's strategy is to bid their valuation, i.e. b1 {cl} = 1:1. What is bidder 2's best response? {b} Suppose bidder 1's strategy is to bid b1 [1:1] = \"21. \"That is bidder 2's best response? {c} What is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game? [You dont need to show that the equilibrium is the unique syrmnetric equilibrium. Just nd symmetric strategies that are a best response to each other.)