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2. (12 points) Consider the infinitely repeated Bertrand competition as studied in class, but assume there are N firms. (a) Show that a grim trigger

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2. (12 points) Consider the infinitely repeated Bertrand competition as studied in class, but assume there are N firms. (a) Show that a grim trigger strategy can sustain collusion in a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for a sufficiently high discount factor S. (b) How does the threshold for & in part (a) change when N changes? Briefly interpret

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