2. (12 Total Points) (Two 2-part Pricing Scheme) Suppose there are two consumers. Consumer I has a demand curve given by P = 50 -q. Consumer II has a demand curve given by P = 60 - 1/3 q. The firm offers two packages: . Package I: Low quality, low-priced package Package II: High quality, high-priced package The firm has no fixed costs, and the marginal cost of production = 0. The firm wants to maximize its profit by charging a flat fee to each type of consumer. After the consumer pays the flat fee, they can buy all of the good they want at a price = $0. a) (6 points) Assuming the firm is maximizing its profit, what fee will it charge to Type I consumers? (You can assume that if the consumer is indifferent between buying the package and not buying the package, that the consumer will buy the package.) b) (6 points) Assuming the firm is maximizing its profit, what fee will it charge to Type II consumers? (You can assume that if the consumer is indifferent between buying the package and not buying the package, that the consumer will buy the package.) A