2. [20 pts] Two candidates - a chicken and a lizard - have been proposed as the class mascots. Suppose that the class consists of n individuals and that half of them prefer the chicken (C) and half prefer the lizard (L). A vote is held as to which animal will be the class mascot. If an individual's preferred animal wins their payoff is 4; if it loses, their payoff is 0; if the animals tie, the payoff is 2. The utility cost of voting is -1 and it is in addition to the payoff from the outcome. Note that an individual is not forced to vote. Suppose that n = 2, i.e., there are only 2 individuals who are in the class and one of them prefers L and the other C. a. [5 pts] Write this game in matrix form. b. [3 pts] Solve for all the pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. c. [5 pts] Is/Are the NE efficient? If yes, explain why. If no, give a strategy profile that Pareto dominates the NE. d. [7 pts] Suppose next that the cost of voting is 3. Find the NE for this game. Are the NE efficient? If yes, explain why. If no, give a strategy profile that Pareto dominates the NE