2) [25 pts] Firm 1 and firm 2 must implement a policy d from a set of possible policies D. After d is installed, it will affect the payoff function for each firm according to concave functions II and II. Assume that the policy that maximizes firm j's payoff is d; and d* maximizes II+II, where d d d*. Also, assume that firm 1 has the right to impose d and firm 2 can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to firm 1 in the form of a transfer t(d) to induce firm 1 to implement d. a) What is t(d) and why is the offer a function of d? Explain. b) Calculate the value of the right that firm 1 is given. c) Explain if it is possible for firm 2 to implement d. Assume that if firm 1 is indifferent between accepting an offer or not them he will accept.