2. {4 points} Consider the signaling theory covered in class. Assume that there are two types of workers: Type L (\"low productivity") and Type H (\"high productivity"). Each worker can obtain 3 units of education at a cost. For each worker type. its marginal product of labor and cost of acquiring education are as follows: l Marginal product of labor l Cost of .3 units of education T'ueL lO+s 2s The rm cannot observe each worker's true type. However. it can observe how many units of education each worker has acquired. Assume that if the rm observes that a worker has s* or higher units of education, the rm believes that they are Type H {regardless of whether the worker's true type is Type H or not). The rm pays wages based on the rm's belief of their type. Assume that the rm operates in a perfectly competitive market and their output price is p=1. For each worker, dene their payoff as (wages cost of .3 units of education) with 0 :1 s :1 20 (think of s=16 being college education). a) (I point) For each worker type, write down their payoffs for each of these two cases: Case (i): Ifs