2 A society is composed of 3 individuals named 1, 50, and 100. There are three alternatives: 2, 60, and 90. For each individual 2' E {1, 50, 100}, her utility from alternative A 6 {2,60, 90} is given by ui(A)=-li-A| where |x| is the absolute value of as. 2.1 How does each individual rank the three alternatives? 2.2 Which alternatives are Pareto efcient? 2.3 Which alternatives maximize social surplus, i.e., Z w (A)? e{1,50,100} Assume that voters vote sincerely. 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Consider a majority vote between alternatives 2 and 60. Which alternative would win? Consider a majority vote between alternatives 60 and 90. Which alternative would win? Consider a majority vote between alternatives 2 and 90. Which alternative would win? Suppose we used the Open Agenda Method. Which alternative would be chosen