2 A society is composed of 3 individuals named 1, 50, and 100. There are three alternatives: 2, 60, and 90. For each individual i e {1, 50, 100), her utility from alternative A c {2, 60, 90} is given by u' (A) = -|i -Al where (r| is the absolute value of r. 2.1 How does each individual rank the three alternatives? 2.2 Which alternatives are Pareto efficient? 2.3 Which alternatives maximize social surplus, i.e., 2 (A ) ? ie [1,50,100] Assume that voters vote sincerely. 2.4 Consider a majority vote between alternatives 2 and 60. Which alternative would win? 2.5 Consider a majority vote between alternatives 60 and 90. Which alternative would win? 2.6 Consider a majority vote between alternatives 2 and 90. Which alternative would win? 2.7 Suppose we used the Open Agenda Method. Which alternative would be chosen