2. Asymmetric Information. Now let's examine the impact of asymmetric information on the credit market equilibrium. Specifically, in this question we assume that Xinda is not able to observe or enforce the project that the borrower chooses. As a result, the loan contract can only specify the interest rate (not the project). Everything else remains as in problem 1. a. What type of asymmetric information problem does Xinda face? Adverse Selection b. Xinda now has to consider how his choice of the interest rate affects Anubhab's choice of project. For what range of interest rates will Anubhab prefer Project 1 to Project 2? (Assume that if the two projects have the same expected income, Anubhab will choose Project 1.) 0 to 0.6 c. For what range of interest rates will Anubhab prefer Project 2 to Project 17 0.6 to 1.7333 d. Above what interest rate will Anubhab prefer not to borrow? Above 1.73