2. Consider a market with (inverse) demand p = 100 - 2Q. There are two firms in the market with constant marginal and average costs
2. Consider a market with (inverse) demand p = 100 - 2Q. There are two firms in the market with constant marginal and average costs of $10. a. Determine the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price. b. What would be the collusive (joint-profit maximizing) price and quantity? C. Derive the deadweight loss from (i) Cournot Duopoly, (ii) Collusion, and (iii) Perfect competition in this market with the two firms
2. Consider a market with (inverse) demand p = 100 - 2Q. There are two firms in the market with constant marginal and average costs of $10. a. b. 012 C. Determine the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price. What would be the collusive (joint-profit maximizing) price and quantity? Derive the deadweight loss from (i) Cournot Duopoly, (ii) Collusion, and (iii) Perfect competition in this market with the two firms.
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Given Information Inverse demand function p 100 2 Q p 100 2Q p1002Q Marginal cost MC and average cost AC for each firm 10 There are two firms in the market Cournot duopoly Part a Cournot Equilibrium Q...
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