2) Consider an auction with 3 bidders. The value of the good for bidder 1 is 10, the value for bidder 2 is also 10, and the value for bidder 3 is 8. The rules of the auction are that bidders can submit any number, the highest bid wins the auction, and, if there is a tie, the winner is randomly chosen (from those who submit the highest bid). Which of the following statements are correct (you can circle more than one answer): a. In a first-price auction, in every pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the seller's revenue is exactly 10. b. In a first-price auction, in every pure strategy Nash equilibrium, bidder 3 never wins the auction. C. In a second-price auction, in every pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the seller's revenue is exactly 10. d. In a second-price auction, in every pure strategy Nash equilibrium, bidder 3 never wins the auction. e. In an all-pay auction, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. f. In an all-pay auction, there is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which the seller's expected revenue is 9. Grading key: deduct 2 points for every mistake. (10 Marks)