2. Consider the following game in extensive form, where Nature is equally likely to choose A or B. 2. 2 u 3, 1 L u 1 R 0, 0 d 1/2 jA d 1, 0 2 -1. 0 Nature 2 u 1/2 IB u - 2, 0 0, 1 d L R d -1, 2 (a) (15 points) Find all the separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (or show that there are none).(b) (15 points) Is there a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which 1 always plays R? Describe it or show that there is no such equilibrium. (c) (20 points) Assume that the game is the same as above with one difference: Player 2 does not see What Player 1 did when he moves. Solve the game using the appropriate solution concept