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2. Consider the following signalling game. I First, nature draws the productivity of a worker, which is 4 with probability g and 2 with probability

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2. Consider the following signalling game. I First, nature draws the productivity of a worker, which is 4 with probability g and 2 with probability 1 3. o The worker then decides whether or not to get educated. Let E denote education and N denote no education and assume that education costs 1 for the type with productivity 4 and 3 for the type with productivity 2. u A rm then observes whether or not the worker is educated. Due to some (job killing!) regulations the rm must pay a wage of 11: with 2 0 if the rm hires a high productivity worker and 2 w

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