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Consider the following two-player simultaneous-move game, called the rock- paper-scissors-lizard game. Player 1 is the row player; player 2 is the column player. R stands for rock, P for paper, S for scissors, and L for lizard. R beats S but loses against P and L; P beats R but loses against S and L; S beats P but loses against R and L; L beats R, P and S. The payoff for winning is 1 - xi, with i = R, P, S, L, and the payoff for losing is -1; when both players choose the same strategy they each get 0. Assume that TR = Up = Es = 0 and that CL 2 0 (this implies that the payoff for winning with R, P, or S is equal to 1, and the payoff from winning wit L is equal to 1 - TL). Moreover, assume that Player Row chooses R with probability r, P with probability p, and S with probability s (similarly for Player Column). a) Write down the normal form representation of the game. b ) Assume that XL = 0. Find all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed strategies) of the game. Comment