2. Consider the innitely repeated alternating offer bargaining game that we studied in class. Each period consists of a proposal and a reject! accept decision. If the proposal is accepted, the game ends. Otherwise, the game continues on to the next period and the next player whose turn it is makes a proposal. a. Consider the two player game, where player 1 moves rst and player 2 moves second. Suppose these two players have dierent discount factors, i.e., player 1's discount factor is 61 and player 2's discount factor is 62 and 61 at 62. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium allocation in this case as a function of these two discount factors. b. Consider the three player (legislative) bargaining version of this game where all three players have the same discount factor, 5, and players 1, 2, 3 move rst, second and third, respectively. Suppose further that the decision to accept or reject a proposal is made by majority rule rather than by unanimity, the case we studied in class. Under majority rule, it takes just two of the three players (a majority) to accept a proposal in order for it to be implemented. Find the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium allocation to each of the three players in this majority rule case as a function of the common discount factor, 6