2. First Price Auction (Modied) A rst edition copy of The Tragically Divine is being auctioned off. A, B and C are the only bidders for the book. A values the copy at DA 2 $107 13 at 113 = 20 While C values it at 110 = 40. The three must simultaneously submit one of the following bids, $0, $10, $207 $30, $40. Let the highest bid be denoted by b. If there are m highest bidders and i is one of them then the payoff to i is :7: b. All others get a payoff of 0. a) Is each player bidding their own valuation a Nash Equilibrium? b) Is there a Nash Equilibrium where A is the only highest bidder? If so write down the bids; if not explain Why. e) State the bids of a Nash Equilibrium that results in only C winning the auction