2. Now consider an actual Cournot game with two rms. For concreteness, let's take P(Y) = 45 Y and symmetric cost functions C(yi) = 33,11: (a) i. Compute the NE of this Cournot game, (yin). ii. Compute prots for each rm in the NE. (b) Compute i. monopoly output ym, and 1I dened Nash Reversion in the slides for October 24 but not in class. GRIM in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma was Nash reversion. In this game, Nash reversion means play is (L, L) in every period until someone deviates. After that, the players play the NE of the stage game repeatedly. ii. monopoly prot. (c) By joint monopoly, I mean the output prole in which each rm pro- duces half the amount you found in Question 2b. i. What is each rm's individual prot under joint monopoly? (This should be trivial.) ii. If the other rm produces its half of joint monopoly output what output by you produces the most prot for you, and what is your prot? (d) Finally, consider the repeated version of this game. Find the minimum discount factor for which the joint monopoly is supported by Nash rever sion in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Hint: To do this, you need to compute the payoff from the best one period deviation away from joint monopoly (in subsequent periods, the best you can get is the stage game NE). You need to use your answer to Q2(c)ii. I go through this calculation, for a slightly dierent Cournot model, in supplemental slides on Day 15