2. Suppose there are two risk-neutral bidders participating in a sealed bid first-price auction for an object of common value v. This means both players have the same value for the object. Player 1 knows the value of v; Player 2 knows only that v is uniformly distributed on (0,1). (The probability distribution is commonly known.) Show that Player 2 will never use a pure strategy in equilibrium. Calculate the equilibrium in which Player 1 uses a pure strategy (define what a strategy is for Player 1 first) and Player 2 uses a mixed strategy 2. Suppose there are two risk-neutral bidders participating in a sealed bid first-price auction for an object of common value v. This means both players have the same value for the object. Player 1 knows the value of v; Player 2 knows only that v is uniformly distributed on (0,1). (The probability distribution is commonly known.) Show that Player 2 will never use a pure strategy in equilibrium. Calculate the equilibrium in which Player 1 uses a pure strategy (define what a strategy is for Player 1 first) and Player 2 uses a mixed strategy