2. What should be the value of a so that Player 1 will have a dominant strategy? PLAYER 2 C PLAYER A (3.4) (05) 1 B (G. D) (1, 1] 3. Determine the Nach Equilibrium for the following normal form of the game. HARLEY LIP DOWN (10,10) (84) MARY DOWN (4.87 (5.51 PLAYER 2 LEFT CENTER RIGHT (3. D) (0.0 PLAYER MIDDLE (5.0 DOWN (0. 1] (4.2) (0.1) C) Apply the iterative elimination, PLAYER 2 E F A 3.1) (0. 17 PLAYER 1 (1, 1) (1,1) (5.01 C (0. 1) (42) (0.1) DJ Apply the iterative elimination, PLAYER 2 Y A (6.3) (6.3) (6.4] (6.7) PLAYER B (1, 1) (1,99) (1.4) (1,D) C (99.0) (3.991 (0.1 D (5,1) (0. 2) (99.4) (5.5)4: Drawan extensive form of the corresponding normal form in #4 (8, C & D) then apply the backward induction method to determine the Nash Equilibrium. 5. Determine the best decision for Company A using backward induction. Consider the following: 1 Branch: Company A will join (!) the market or not [N) and I Branch: If A joins the market, Company B will make negative ads (P), positive ads [Ne); or do neither [Nothing - No] 3 Branch: If B will make the ads whether positive or negative, Company A will Either retaliate (R) or leave (L) the market. (2. 4) A (0, 1) B (5, 5) A A (1, 0) 14, 3)