2. What should Dr. Lacy recommend be done to avoid similar problems in the future?

Northeast Research Laboratory (B) On a Friday morning in late December 1973, Sam Lacy, head of the Physical Sciences Division of Northeast Research Laboratory (NRL), thought about two letters which lay on his desk. Onc, which he had rcccived a few weeks before, was a progress report from Robert Kirk, recently assigned project leader of the Exco project, who reported that earlier frictions between the NRL team and the client had lessened considerably, that high-quality research was under way, and that the prospects for retaining the Exco project on a long-term basis appeared fairly good. The other letter, which had just moring s h Exco contract effective immediately. Lacy was puzzled. He remembered how pleascd Gray Kenney had been only a few months before when the Exco project produced its second patentable process. On the other hand, he also recalled some of the difficulties the project had encountered within NRL which had ultimately led to the replacement of project leader Alan North in an effort the participants order o avoid losing the contract. Lacy decided to cal to piece together an understanding of what had happened. Some of what he learned is described below. But the problem remained for him to decide what he should report to senior management. What should he recommend situation in the future? avoid the recurrence of such a Company Background Northeast Research Laboratory was a multidisciplinary research and development organization employing approximately 1,000 professionals. It was organized into two main sectors, one for economics and business admins ector, the physical and i organization was essentially by branches of science. The main units were called div sions and the subunits were called laboratories. A partial organization chart is shown ir Most of the company's work was done on the basis of contracts with clients. Each contract was a project. Responsibility for the project was vested in a project leader, and through him up the organizational structure in which his laboratory was located. Typically, some members of the project team were drawn from laboratories other than that in which the project leader worked; it was the ability to put together a team with a variety of technical talents that was one of the principal strengths of disciplinary laboratory. Team members worked under the direction of the project leader during the period in which they were assigned to the project. An individual might be working on more than one project concurrently. The project leader could also draw on the resources of central service organizations, such as model shops, computer services, editorial, and drafting. The project was billed for the services of these units at rates which were intended to cover their full costs multi Inception of the Exco Project In October 1972, Gray Kenney, vice president of Exca, had telephoned Mac Davidson of NRL to outline a rescarch project which would examine the effect of microwaves on various ores and minerals. Davidson was associate head of the Physical Sciences Division and had known Kenney for several ycars. During the conversation Kenney asserted that NRL ought to be particularly intrigued by the research aspects of the project, and Davidson readily agreed. Davidson was also pleased because the Physical Sciences Division was under pressure to generate more revenue, and this potentialy long-ler po enent nf NRL had: nly cirulated several memos indicat- ing that more emphasis should be put on commercial rather than government work. was aen one division, but in fact reaui nce from the Electronics nr lahoratory Division to complement work that would be done in two different Physical Sciences Laboratories (the Cherhistry Laboratory and the Materials Laboratory. A few days later Davidson organized a joint client-NRL conference to determine what Exco wanted and to plan the proposal. Kenney sent his assistant, Tod Denby, who was to serve as the Exco liaison officer for the project. Representing NRL were Davidson; Sam Lacy; Dr. Robert Kirk, director of the Materials Laboratory (one of the two Physical Sciences laboratories involved in the project); Dr. Alan North Chemistry Laboratory): Dr. James Noble, exccutive director of the Electronics Divi- sion; and a few researchers chosen by Kirk and North. Davidson also would have liked to invite Dr. James Ross, director of the Chemistry Laboratory, but Ross was out of town and couldn't attend the pre-proposal meeting. Denby described the project ass a study of the use of microwaves for the conversion of basic ores and minerals to more valuable commercial products. The study was to consist of two parts: Task A-An experimental program to examine the effect of microwaves on 50 ores and minerals, and to select those processes appearing to have the most promise. Task B-A basic study to obtain an understanding of how and why microwaves interact with certain minerals. three laboratories: (1) Mate It was agreed that the project would be a joint effort rials, (2) Chemistry, and (3) Electromagnetic. The first two laboratories were in the Physical Sciences Division, and the last was in the Electronics Division. Denby proposed that the contract be open-ended, with a level of effort of around $10,000-S12,000 per month. Agreement was quickly reached on the content of the proposal. Denby emphasized to the group that an early start was cssential if Exco was to remain ahead of its competition. After the meeting Lacy, who was to have overall responsibility for the project, di a 37-ycar-old chemist who had had experience as a project leader on several projects head the interdi don at the pre-proposal meeting and at Dr Ross Chead of the laboratory in which North worked) was unahle to participate in the decision of who should head the joint project. In fact, because he was out neither aware of the Exco project nor of his laboratory's involvement in it The following day, Alan North was told of his appointment as project leader. During the next few days, he conferred with Robert Kirk, head of the other Physical Sciences laboratory involved pressure on North to finalize the proposal, stating that the substance had been agreed upon at the pre-proposal conference. North thereupon drafted a five-page letter as a substitute for a formal proposal, describing the nature of the project and outlining the procedures and equipment necessary. At Denby's request, North included a paragraph which au town, Ross was the projcct. Toward the end of October Denby began to ekert nt's staf Th members of the c of the DOsal's cover sheet contained anppmval ignatures from the laboratories and divisions involved. North signed for his own area and for laboratory director Ross. He telephoned Dr. Noble of the Electronics Division, relayed the client's sense of urgency, and Noble authorized North to sign for him. Davidson signed for the Physical Sciences Division as a whole. At this stage, North relied principally on the advice of colleagucs within his own division. As he did not know personally the individuals in the Electronics Division, they were not called upon at this point. Since North understood informally that the director of the Electromagnetic Sciences Laboratory, Dr. Perkins, was quite busy and often out of town, North did not attempt to discuss the project with Perkins. After the proposal had been signed and mailed, Dr. Perkins was sent a copy. It lic nd eg qpent whch the client wanted purchased for the project cteristics of the power supply (necessary for quantitative measurement) specified in posal were inadequate for the task. He asked North about it and North said that the lient hd mude to be used. Denby had said he was pavine fnr that oment and intended to move it to Exco's laboratories after the completion of the NRL contract t was All these events had transpired rather quickly. By the time Dr. Ross, director of the Chemtsy Boss itory, returned, the proposal for the Exco project had been signed Denby on previous project and bad serious misgivings abou working with him, La sorme of Ross's fears by observing that if anyone could succced in working with Denby would be North-a flexible man, professionally competent, who could move with the tide and get along with clients of all types. Conduct of the Project Thus the project began. Periodically, when decisions arose, North would seek opin- was soiewhat unclear about whom he project vever, he should talk to, Davidson bad been the n leader. Normally, however, North worked for Ross. Although Kirk's laborator heavily involved in the project, Kirk was very busy with other Materials Laboratory work. Adding to his uncertainty, North periodically received telephone calls from Perkins of the Electronics Division, whom he didn't know well. Perkins expected to be heavily involved in the project. Difficulties and delays began to plague the project. The microwave equipment specified by the client was not delivered by the manufacturer on schedule, and there were problems in filtering the power supply of the radio frequency source. Over the objection of NRL Electromagnetic Sciences engineers, but at the insistence of the I to improve the power supply filter. Even- tually the equipment had to be sent back to the manufacturer for modification. This required several months In the spring of 1973, Denby, who had made his presence felt from the outset, began to apply strong pressure. "Listen," he said to North, "top management of Exco is starting to get on my back and we need results. Besides, I'm up for review in four months and I can't afford to let this project affect my promotion." Denby was con stantly at NRIL during the next few months. He was often in the labs conferring individually with members of the NRL teams. Denby also visited North's office frequently. A number of related problems began to surface. North had agreed to do both experimental and theoretical work for this project, but Denby's constant pushing for experimental results began to tilt the emphasis. Theoretical studies began to lapse, and experimental work became the focus the Exco project. From time to time North t least accompany the experimen- che theoretical work should precede or agued that emphasize the theoretical uork Sr resuits led North to temporarily de- One day a senior researcher from Kirk's laboratory came to North to e that people were being "stolen" from his team. "How can we do a balanced project if the thcoretical studies are not given enough work force?" he asked. North explaincd the client's position and asked the researcher to bear with this temporary realignment of the project's resources As the six-month milestone approachcd, Denby expressed increasing dissatisfac- tion with the project's progress. In order to have concrete results to report to Exco management, he directed North a number of times to change the direction of the eseare. On Several occasions various members of the project team had vigorous foundation. North himself snent o ddgng results without laying a careful subject, but Denby seemed to discount its importance. Denby began to ayoid North and to spend most of his time with the other team members. Eventually the experi mental program, initially dedicated to a careful screening of some 50 materials, dete- riorated to a somewhat frantic and crratic pursuit of what appeared to be "promising leads." Lacy and Noble played little or no role in this shift of emphasis. On June 21, 1973, Denby visited North in his office and severely criticized him for proposing a process (hydrochloric acid pickling) that was economically infeasible. In defense, North asked an NRL economist to check his figures. The economist reported back that North's numbers were sound and that, in fact, a source at U.S. Steel indicated that hydrochlorid acid pickling was "generally more economic than the traditional pracess and was increasingly being adopted." Through this and subsequent encoun- ters, the relationship between Denby and North became increasingly strained. Denby continued to express concern about the Exco project's payoff. In an effort to save time, he discouraged the NRL tcam from repeating experiments, a practice that was designed t quently taken as sufficiently accurate, and after hasty analysis were adopted for the purposes of the moment. Not surprisingly, Denby periodically discovered errors in ensure accuracy. Data received from initial experiments were fre- these data. He informed NRL of them. Denby's visits to NRL became more frequent as the summer progressed. Some dug them about .encouraging leads. North occasionally cautioned Denby against too much optimism. Nonetheless, North continued to oblige the client by restructur ing the Exco project to allow for more "production line" scheduling of experiments and for less systematic research nvolved and In August, Narth discovered that vertile could be obtained from iron ore. This discovery was a significant one, and the client applied for a patent. If the reaction could be proved commercially, its potential would be measured in millions of dollars. Soon thereafter, the NRL team discovered that the operation could, in fact, be handled commcrcially in a rotary kiln. The client was notified and soon began a pilot plant that would use the rotary kiln process. Exco's engineering department, after reviewing the plans for the pilot plant, rejected them. It was argued that the rotary process was infeasible and that a fluid bed process would have to be used instead. Denby returned to NRL and insisted on an experiment to test the fluid bed process. North warned Denby that agglomeration (a sticking together of the material) he had not received "timely" wawas highly agglomeration taking place, and indicated that he had becn misled as to the feasibility of the rotary kiln process. Work continued, and two other "disclosures of invention" were turned over client by the end of September. the Personnel Changes On September 30, Denby came to North's office to request that Charles Fenton be removed from the Exco project. Denby reported he had been watching Fenton in the Electromagnetic Laboratory, which he visited often, and had observed that Fenton spent relatively little time on the Exco project. North, who did not know Fenton well, agreed to look into it. But Denby insisted that Fenton be removed immediately and threatened to terminate the contract if he were allowed to remain. North was unable to talk vacation. He did talk to Fenton as soon as he returned, and the rescarcher admitted that due to the pressure of other work he had not devoted as much time or effort to th Fenton before taking action because Fenton was on eny.clled a meeting with Mac Davidson and Sam Lacy. It was their first meeting since the pre-proposal conference for the Exco project. w Denby was brief and to the point: Denby: Im here because we have to replace North. He's become increasingly difficult to work with and is obstructing the progress of the project Lacy: but North is an awfully good man.. ood solid work thus far. What about the process David of extracting ver tile from iron are he came up with. And Denby: Im sorry, but we have to have a new project leader. I don't mean to be abrupt, but it's either replace North or forget the contract Ten months later the client was experimenting with the rotary kiln process for producing vertile frum iron ore his awn labaratory. Davidsan reluctantly appointed Robert Kirk project leader and informed North of the decision, North went to see Davidson a few days later. Davidson told him that although management did not agree with the client, North had been replaced in order Saye ater Dr. Lacy told North the same thing. Neither Lacy nor Davidson made an effort to Following the ch enior management on the matter reconstruct. It appeared that Kirk p, the record became more difficult to morale remained low. Denby continued to makeorts to get the team together, but NRL but found that the NRL researchers were not talking as freely with him as they Denby became skeptical about the project's value. Weeks slipped by. No furth breakthroughs emerged. Lacy's Problem Dr. Lacy had Teceived weekly status reports on the project, the latest of which is shown in Exhibit 2. He he principally with North and Kirk. Hawinformal conversations about the project the reports submitted to Exco. If the project had been placed on NRL 's*""problem list.i of the projects which scemed to be experiencing the most dif t0 percent received a written report on its status weekly, but the Exco project was not on With the background given above, Lacy reread Kenney's letter terminating the Exco contract. It seemed likely that Kenney, too, had not had full knowledge of what went on during the project's existence. In his letter, Kenney mentioned the "glowing re- ports" which reached his ears in the early stages of the work. These reports, which came to him only from Denby, were later significantly modified, and Denby appar- had been "leading him on." Kenney pointed to the complete lack of economic evaluation of alternative processes in the experimentation. He seemed unaware of the fact that at Denby's insistence all economic analysis was by the client. Kenney was most dissatisfied that NRL had not f the proposal, particularly those that required full complied with all screening of all materials and the Lacy wondered why Denby's changes of the f the theoretical work the NRL team. Why hadn't he heard more of the problems of the documented by Lacy requested a technical evaluation of the project from the eco t before? director, and asked Davidson for his evaluation of the project. These reports are given in Exhibits additional information he should submit to NRL senior management and 4. When he reviewed these reports, Lacy wondered what, if any, Questions 1. Prepare a list of the problems associated with the Exca project, classifying them into categories that vou consider 2, What should Dr. Lacy recommend be done to avoid similar problems in the future? l action EXHIBIT 1 Organization Chart (simplified) President Vice President Research Operations Faysical Science D Sarn Lacy, Ae ision Electronics Division ames Noble, Head Pr Mac Davidsan. Marketiog Associate Head Materis Laboratory Chemistry Luboratory Electromagnetic Sciences Labaratory Frank Perkins Directar Dimetor Weckly Project Status Report EXHIBIT 2 NOTICES PAat 3G PRONACCT SUB WOWEHK ENDING Dar TYPE EEV TYPE PRICE CLIENT 12-22-73 pOMESTIC PROI INDUS SCA YD 3273 0D COD PROJECTIACCOUNT STATLS REPORT 325 DIVISION PHYSICAL SCI INST EXCO ur KIRK DEPARTMENT ROBERT KIRK MICROWAVES IN CONVERSION OF BASIC ORES AND MINERALS CHEMISTRY LAB TRANSACTIONS RDCOADED 12-4-21-13-31-13 LA TS NO DATE BUBDEN OVERHEA 11:06-74 FEE READY ATE STUP WOR DATE WEHK TO TU 10s c0 ATI 150 28.g0 NAME OBJ -06-72 6.0 ABCR HOUR 13 KIRK 12-22-73 363073 02345 322 DOLLARS BALANCE 02345 22 PIDLJWK Tro DATE ESTIMATE TO TATK CATRGORJES 163r67 25 DENSMORE 13 560 15.0 SUPERVISOR SENIOR (11, 12) 236544 4. COOK 12-22-13 03260 77 12110 12-08-73 1671 36.0 SIONAL 8.0 HOWARD ECHNICAL CLER/SUPP OTHER 376147 5 12-22-73 03 12110 5299 .. (15 579 376149 16, 17. 18) ( (19) 84 12-22-73 25 2357 301 RE 12 72 7 12-22-73 44 40.0 DILLON RO8416 5 15 1238d 1044 LABOR T 13 NAGY 336527 12-22-73 325 12397 150 LLING OVERHEAD DATE 1540 AMOUNT 55110 247s 12-22-73 1227 20 8.0 11-30-73 KAIN 236548 15 11350 KAIN 12-22-73 236548 21 OVERTIME PREM ovs/OTH, PREM TOTAL PERSONNEL 12475 160 652 (21) (22-29) ACCOUNT STATUS 17,0 TE TIME RAYROLT BURDEN 748 154583 BILLED 776 56-59) 1227 154583 SUBCONTRACT PAID OVERHEAD RECOVERY (36) (41, 42) 30.D 60 BOR 3726 DERI MATERIAL 242 R PREMUUM LABOR (43 2820 S EQUIPMENT TOTAL PERSONNEL COSTS COMMUN MATERIALS SERVICES 2 50. 7i: (62, 63, REQUESTUR REF ND OR. PD NO 42 KIRK CONSULTANT REPORT COST OTHER M&S (74, 75 438 REA EXPRESS 54065 48 TIME BALANCE COST BALANCE % 43.5 99TIME BALANCE WKS. 41 61285 39.4 (44, 47) 17234 8741 NAGY * d d pTT 136-6200 0446 56 S TOTAL M&S COSTS 5098 TOTAL M&S coST FEB 26847 BALANCE 3034 T ESTIMATED TRANSACTION TOTAL COMMITMENT o8878 250435 141557 2876 FEE TOTAL L 13189 31565 24376 15F FEE (15.00) 122067 28800D 165933 03 TOTAL COMMITMENT STATUS TO DATE TOTAL CHASGES BALANCE OBJ YENPORDESCRIPTION a NO 61 1 A61289 11-21-73 41 MINNESOTA MINING 345 5 41 5201-2. 3TENNECO CHEMICAL co A9S093 11-15-73 41 UNION CARBIDE CORP 2 2 WATERS & ROGARS 23194 S194 2500 2sr L50 150 300 018046 12-15-73 57 ROGER MD EXHIBIT 3 Tchnical Evaluation EXHIBIT 3 (entinued) BY RONALD M. BENTON Cxccptional capabuiies devoted an unusually Director, Process Economics Program ou sTA D pue THN Aq pauo xplicit expression c car the project termination un ua a Jo ed at o atsap si Principal Conclusions is technically sound. The sented c could bae been greater had this been followed throughout the course of the project "devia hatily, withaut further experiment and careful analysis, and overly or. They re tometimes erroneous and there were frequent tions," Data ws wiven to the lnt as a result a significant amount of the data wa not eproducible. NRL was tnclined to bu but the altered character of the inwestigarion did not prevent accomplishment of fruitful research nd d t d tht ti re n tinn the course of reseach and in interpreting the datn. There is no evidence t Suurega uo paisrsu nts of this roject were as follows a. Extraction of vertile from iron ore by saveral alternative processes. ,jua aq notes that can be placed in this category sassasoud asaqo uopdooo s A Sy uoeuin arquapistuoo paiansnougp pue suonepIsup uttepunt uo pasco SEA papnoun Jo Soda THNoy u 0 Jayay feasibility b. Nitrogen xation the cate of a compuder program that had not been "de-bugged." It war the client who discovered the (The program was eventually straightened out by the d NR of the dierepancies It was, however, shown that the yield of nitrogen oxides was substantially greater than has previ- ously been achieved by either thermal or plasma processes The client's compluint that they were is valid, but it is nol certtin that the given a computer program which had not been "de-bugged" pauJED Jau uM stipu asalt been conducted. It is even j Suisixa nouLs wESod u waui A8 diusuapal aloud beyond very preliminary stages und 1he ultimate axa significance cannot be asscssed aommercial -auuoa a urey nssad 1yd p dts upuy stqio oueu rotary kiln process and then was a r arqisoc uaaq ae 10u pinoa JoJ Jo 3anos pue aoualsixa that microwave plasmas can be generated at c However, it opens the possibility 4. NRL that many processes can be conducted economically pressure p d that the selection of processes for scalo-up and economic studies pauofu by his Engineering Division that this was completely paanpa a Apsoo oo aq piaon e would be the responsibility of the elient. I interpret this Agglameration did take place the first time the process was tried ("open boats") and the client was u papaaxa 1oa sDm THN uve 5. Actual and effective arougndu the conrse of the investi greay a whether lbe original suggestion that a rotary killn be used in the v from the cient or NRI.. In any event, it is a logical choice of equipenent and ertile process came decisions of significance were not documented by NRL and ooly to a limited an Jo pasn a extent by the cient. There was DO attempt on NRL's par to convey the nalure or consequences of asesuap Without the beheft ai at least pt plant would be uneconomic. It is true that a completely 1503 MO1ns O uonangod aouauadxa be in a position to state that such equipment standard rotary kiln probably could not be employcd, if for no otber reason than to preveat the escape of toxic hydrogen sulfide gas f 6. The NRL reports were not well prepured, even considering the circumstances under which thcy were ossible Cqipent. At east special desigo w papaau aq prno. formed as to the overall approach to the investigation 8. bere wis excessive instailed without special desigo and d do not know, of course invoivement oe elent in the details a SEa un pnut mo consideration of major objectives and a ccomplishments progress and adequate 9. In the later stages of the project, the cient tejected a n puada about 45 engineering man-hours, and the design calculations would be more detailed than the sad adhe nur to me, I believe that these judgments were based ona arbitrary opinions as to lechnical feasibility atuouoge leasibility that are probably complete waste even if the proceRs had been basedo a partially false premise o se auaadva ao uo suoeodenxa EI dns pum uouanoa aqL fouon ure the comments responding to the points raised by the client management during your experimental work that i pasie uaaq ou pe alqns ensnu aq pnon ug au pInon uana pu1 eu ruanoo 1. Client anticinated a "full research capabiliry He had hoped for participation by engineers, chem p do 5. The meetings were poorly planned by NRL n fo uonaud o patn0 umod puo sIsaouo I COmpetitor. He feels that the project ore but certainly the extreme frequency of the meetings Como amast exclustvely by chemists. would not be conducive to a well-organized meeting 6. Experimental procedures were not well p This complaint is disciplines appropriate to the investigation (as p ap uy paponoan Amaduo project 1o some degree. In addtion, men of "sd a uo pa ua a (usodand aq u ar su onu se rap u paund aq suauruadxa en atsap J pa ELIIHX papnuo) might conceivably be useful merely for purposes of gatheriag yDEodde ue ons aoueApe ui suo le uno an s p auno pauund PInors o u sa u puE aaiap sq asioaxa Suunsuoo-au ssonme uaaq aABq pinow if NRL had acceded to the request it v As meni q uania ou som cifically excluded NRL from economic evaluations, but NRL did make use of economic considerations in its suggestions and recommendations. w pnposd au g vampou ataunuou auas umgo o1 paruuard THN 8 with them. Many hanged a ay jo asneoaq ino pauue Janau aam paed AmuaLuO suouuadxa Sujaaaas Tikely, therefore, anpuoa aine a e suraas ooud ou o uogoap nm juawuadxa he elienz elatmr that be doer wt critioia NRI r faiting "to produce a process." He says t never expected one, that he wanted a good sereening of ores and reactions as called for in ihe he feels he rom the theorelical studies-Task January 8, 1974 ou seA Ssaoad e uauans ou. expected alod NRL personnel tnvalved that almost immediatcly after the an o asunoo an o Aranuaa Araauo suaos auS From: Mac Davidaon a degree of urgency incompatible with a systematic D an nn mnb aioad theorelical studjes as a part of Task B were never o the whole suoiSnjoo alo 0oxg au.L tenor of the project suggests 4alasa this project igh risk" prgicct. "no nau merely pastponed. Unfortunately, this with other pae punos Atuoruyaa sem ESoduad au.T within the capabilities of the groups assigned t significant effective decisions. project There was virtually in the preparation* Addisional coordination between the working elements of Pbysical Sciences and Electronics the proposal Comments with rew excapdons, was, cobsicring the hanarps critieized by the client's representatives lor having proposed a process (hydrochloric acid pickling) attention to detail NRL reports were not well: written The client, actng nder have access to information of this kind, and ans reaction would certainly have the effect of dis- prepared, even considering the circumstances under rather than steel industry with steel pickling to leaching inquiry to aresponsible person in C.S. Steel as to the starus or hydrochlonc acid pckling. His respDnse there are sitnations ibat are more favorable generally more economical and is becoming increasingly adopted sulfided titanium ore. Nevertheless, I directed an uanh saauey the daor to this kind of interference. to sulfuric acid pickling. hydrochloric a There was nu doeumentation by direction, and i cid pickling is NRL af the decisions made m ua a pauale mphasis of the M NRL were requested by the client, but on an urgent and "not f aDcy" basis. If nqe a o aauanbasuos a anan o Kanooa 0 N 0 ed a uo dae snouas ou sem aay 1odau a z wat te s i re of NRI's Tormel reparts Hawever, the naure a 0 suonoe whon NRL Less than half of the major complaints made by the elient concerning suoas odar an jo PIBA ar aDuBuod s,IN snpLApa ames o prumoi paaap a project team acquiesced too readily easily to the client's ocmands in the client's interference and management ad quiesced too au aur sdee unnars rand am u saram agons e mM srnsand ao cIuoa uanba m SBot understandable to elient's managcment uoddos a1enbopeut aAe pre uostaladns 0arurne the project Recommendations Sty u Japa the establishment of a simple formal procedure by 1 is recommended that consideration be given which high 'spunj ao oqusunuanD, ou aum aaay. identitied at the pa prnoo aloud as assigned for averting or correcting subsequent developments that uonuu a 0 no pae aaes resodoid which s pecific responsibilities are would be adverse to NRLs and the client's i ficient f ytaining obicctive 'upon unphisticated client, nublie or private palitical conditions, sonsuaep auL o os pun 8 uamdde nouun proposal was preped Au a foud su es apeu1eq Northeast Research Laboratory (B) On a Friday morning in late December 1973, Sam Lacy, head of the Physical Sciences Division of Northeast Research Laboratory (NRL), thought about two letters which lay on his desk. Onc, which he had rcccived a few weeks before, was a progress report from Robert Kirk, recently assigned project leader of the Exco project, who reported that earlier frictions between the NRL team and the client had lessened considerably, that high-quality research was under way, and that the prospects for retaining the Exco project on a long-term basis appeared fairly good. The other letter, which had just moring s h Exco contract effective immediately. Lacy was puzzled. He remembered how pleascd Gray Kenney had been only a few months before when the Exco project produced its second patentable process. On the other hand, he also recalled some of the difficulties the project had encountered within NRL which had ultimately led to the replacement of project leader Alan North in an effort the participants order o avoid losing the contract. Lacy decided to cal to piece together an understanding of what had happened. Some of what he learned is described below. But the problem remained for him to decide what he should report to senior management. What should he recommend situation in the future? avoid the recurrence of such a Company Background Northeast Research Laboratory was a multidisciplinary research and development organization employing approximately 1,000 professionals. It was organized into two main sectors, one for economics and business admins ector, the physical and i organization was essentially by branches of science. The main units were called div sions and the subunits were called laboratories. A partial organization chart is shown ir Most of the company's work was done on the basis of contracts with clients. Each contract was a project. Responsibility for the project was vested in a project leader, and through him up the organizational structure in which his laboratory was located. Typically, some members of the project team were drawn from laboratories other than that in which the project leader worked; it was the ability to put together a team with a variety of technical talents that was one of the principal strengths of disciplinary laboratory. Team members worked under the direction of the project leader during the period in which they were assigned to the project. An individual might be working on more than one project concurrently. The project leader could also draw on the resources of central service organizations, such as model shops, computer services, editorial, and drafting. The project was billed for the services of these units at rates which were intended to cover their full costs multi Inception of the Exco Project In October 1972, Gray Kenney, vice president of Exca, had telephoned Mac Davidson of NRL to outline a rescarch project which would examine the effect of microwaves on various ores and minerals. Davidson was associate head of the Physical Sciences Division and had known Kenney for several ycars. During the conversation Kenney asserted that NRL ought to be particularly intrigued by the research aspects of the project, and Davidson readily agreed. Davidson was also pleased because the Physical Sciences Division was under pressure to generate more revenue, and this potentialy long-ler po enent nf NRL had: nly cirulated several memos indicat- ing that more emphasis should be put on commercial rather than government work. was aen one division, but in fact reaui nce from the Electronics nr lahoratory Division to complement work that would be done in two different Physical Sciences Laboratories (the Cherhistry Laboratory and the Materials Laboratory. A few days later Davidson organized a joint client-NRL conference to determine what Exco wanted and to plan the proposal. Kenney sent his assistant, Tod Denby, who was to serve as the Exco liaison officer for the project. Representing NRL were Davidson; Sam Lacy; Dr. Robert Kirk, director of the Materials Laboratory (one of the two Physical Sciences laboratories involved in the project); Dr. Alan North Chemistry Laboratory): Dr. James Noble, exccutive director of the Electronics Divi- sion; and a few researchers chosen by Kirk and North. Davidson also would have liked to invite Dr. James Ross, director of the Chemistry Laboratory, but Ross was out of town and couldn't attend the pre-proposal meeting. Denby described the project ass a study of the use of microwaves for the conversion of basic ores and minerals to more valuable commercial products. The study was to consist of two parts: Task A-An experimental program to examine the effect of microwaves on 50 ores and minerals, and to select those processes appearing to have the most promise. Task B-A basic study to obtain an understanding of how and why microwaves interact with certain minerals. three laboratories: (1) Mate It was agreed that the project would be a joint effort rials, (2) Chemistry, and (3) Electromagnetic. The first two laboratories were in the Physical Sciences Division, and the last was in the Electronics Division. Denby proposed that the contract be open-ended, with a level of effort of around $10,000-S12,000 per month. Agreement was quickly reached on the content of the proposal. Denby emphasized to the group that an early start was cssential if Exco was to remain ahead of its competition. After the meeting Lacy, who was to have overall responsibility for the project, di a 37-ycar-old chemist who had had experience as a project leader on several projects head the interdi don at the pre-proposal meeting and at Dr Ross Chead of the laboratory in which North worked) was unahle to participate in the decision of who should head the joint project. In fact, because he was out neither aware of the Exco project nor of his laboratory's involvement in it The following day, Alan North was told of his appointment as project leader. During the next few days, he conferred with Robert Kirk, head of the other Physical Sciences laboratory involved pressure on North to finalize the proposal, stating that the substance had been agreed upon at the pre-proposal conference. North thereupon drafted a five-page letter as a substitute for a formal proposal, describing the nature of the project and outlining the procedures and equipment necessary. At Denby's request, North included a paragraph which au town, Ross was the projcct. Toward the end of October Denby began to ekert nt's staf Th members of the c of the DOsal's cover sheet contained anppmval ignatures from the laboratories and divisions involved. North signed for his own area and for laboratory director Ross. He telephoned Dr. Noble of the Electronics Division, relayed the client's sense of urgency, and Noble authorized North to sign for him. Davidson signed for the Physical Sciences Division as a whole. At this stage, North relied principally on the advice of colleagucs within his own division. As he did not know personally the individuals in the Electronics Division, they were not called upon at this point. Since North understood informally that the director of the Electromagnetic Sciences Laboratory, Dr. Perkins, was quite busy and often out of town, North did not attempt to discuss the project with Perkins. After the proposal had been signed and mailed, Dr. Perkins was sent a copy. It lic nd eg qpent whch the client wanted purchased for the project cteristics of the power supply (necessary for quantitative measurement) specified in posal were inadequate for the task. He asked North about it and North said that the lient hd mude to be used. Denby had said he was pavine fnr that oment and intended to move it to Exco's laboratories after the completion of the NRL contract t was All these events had transpired rather quickly. By the time Dr. Ross, director of the Chemtsy Boss itory, returned, the proposal for the Exco project had been signed Denby on previous project and bad serious misgivings abou working with him, La sorme of Ross's fears by observing that if anyone could succced in working with Denby would be North-a flexible man, professionally competent, who could move with the tide and get along with clients of all types. Conduct of the Project Thus the project began. Periodically, when decisions arose, North would seek opin- was soiewhat unclear about whom he project vever, he should talk to, Davidson bad been the n leader. Normally, however, North worked for Ross. Although Kirk's laborator heavily involved in the project, Kirk was very busy with other Materials Laboratory work. Adding to his uncertainty, North periodically received telephone calls from Perkins of the Electronics Division, whom he didn't know well. Perkins expected to be heavily involved in the project. Difficulties and delays began to plague the project. The microwave equipment specified by the client was not delivered by the manufacturer on schedule, and there were problems in filtering the power supply of the radio frequency source. Over the objection of NRL Electromagnetic Sciences engineers, but at the insistence of the I to improve the power supply filter. Even- tually the equipment had to be sent back to the manufacturer for modification. This required several months In the spring of 1973, Denby, who had made his presence felt from the outset, began to apply strong pressure. "Listen," he said to North, "top management of Exco is starting to get on my back and we need results. Besides, I'm up for review in four months and I can't afford to let this project affect my promotion." Denby was con stantly at NRIL during the next few months. He was often in the labs conferring individually with members of the NRL teams. Denby also visited North's office frequently. A number of related problems began to surface. North had agreed to do both experimental and theoretical work for this project, but Denby's constant pushing for experimental results began to tilt the emphasis. Theoretical studies began to lapse, and experimental work became the focus the Exco project. From time to time North t least accompany the experimen- che theoretical work should precede or agued that emphasize the theoretical uork Sr resuits led North to temporarily de- One day a senior researcher from Kirk's laboratory came to North to e that people were being "stolen" from his team. "How can we do a balanced project if the thcoretical studies are not given enough work force?" he asked. North explaincd the client's position and asked the researcher to bear with this temporary realignment of the project's resources As the six-month milestone approachcd, Denby expressed increasing dissatisfac- tion with the project's progress. In order to have concrete results to report to Exco management, he directed North a number of times to change the direction of the eseare. On Several occasions various members of the project team had vigorous foundation. North himself snent o ddgng results without laying a careful subject, but Denby seemed to discount its importance. Denby began to ayoid North and to spend most of his time with the other team members. Eventually the experi mental program, initially dedicated to a careful screening of some 50 materials, dete- riorated to a somewhat frantic and crratic pursuit of what appeared to be "promising leads." Lacy and Noble played little or no role in this shift of emphasis. On June 21, 1973, Denby visited North in his office and severely criticized him for proposing a process (hydrochloric acid pickling) that was economically infeasible. In defense, North asked an NRL economist to check his figures. The economist reported back that North's numbers were sound and that, in fact, a source at U.S. Steel indicated that hydrochlorid acid pickling was "generally more economic than the traditional pracess and was increasingly being adopted." Through this and subsequent encoun- ters, the relationship between Denby and North became increasingly strained. Denby continued to express concern about the Exco project's payoff. In an effort to save time, he discouraged the NRL tcam from repeating experiments, a practice that was designed t quently taken as sufficiently accurate, and after hasty analysis were adopted for the purposes of the moment. Not surprisingly, Denby periodically discovered errors in ensure accuracy. Data received from initial experiments were fre- these data. He informed NRL of them. Denby's visits to NRL became more frequent as the summer progressed. Some dug them about .encouraging leads. North occasionally cautioned Denby against too much optimism. Nonetheless, North continued to oblige the client by restructur ing the Exco project to allow for more "production line" scheduling of experiments and for less systematic research nvolved and In August, Narth discovered that vertile could be obtained from iron ore. This discovery was a significant one, and the client applied for a patent. If the reaction could be proved commercially, its potential would be measured in millions of dollars. Soon thereafter, the NRL team discovered that the operation could, in fact, be handled commcrcially in a rotary kiln. The client was notified and soon began a pilot plant that would use the rotary kiln process. Exco's engineering department, after reviewing the plans for the pilot plant, rejected them. It was argued that the rotary process was infeasible and that a fluid bed process would have to be used instead. Denby returned to NRL and insisted on an experiment to test the fluid bed process. North warned Denby that agglomeration (a sticking together of the material) he had not received "timely" wawas highly agglomeration taking place, and indicated that he had becn misled as to the feasibility of the rotary kiln process. Work continued, and two other "disclosures of invention" were turned over client by the end of September. the Personnel Changes On September 30, Denby came to North's office to request that Charles Fenton be removed from the Exco project. Denby reported he had been watching Fenton in the Electromagnetic Laboratory, which he visited often, and had observed that Fenton spent relatively little time on the Exco project. North, who did not know Fenton well, agreed to look into it. But Denby insisted that Fenton be removed immediately and threatened to terminate the contract if he were allowed to remain. North was unable to talk vacation. He did talk to Fenton as soon as he returned, and the rescarcher admitted that due to the pressure of other work he had not devoted as much time or effort to th Fenton before taking action because Fenton was on eny.clled a meeting with Mac Davidson and Sam Lacy. It was their first meeting since the pre-proposal conference for the Exco project. w Denby was brief and to the point: Denby: Im here because we have to replace North. He's become increasingly difficult to work with and is obstructing the progress of the project Lacy: but North is an awfully good man.. ood solid work thus far. What about the process David of extracting ver tile from iron are he came up with. And Denby: Im sorry, but we have to have a new project leader. I don't mean to be abrupt, but it's either replace North or forget the contract Ten months later the client was experimenting with the rotary kiln process for producing vertile frum iron ore his awn labaratory. Davidsan reluctantly appointed Robert Kirk project leader and informed North of the decision, North went to see Davidson a few days later. Davidson told him that although management did not agree with the client, North had been replaced in order Saye ater Dr. Lacy told North the same thing. Neither Lacy nor Davidson made an effort to Following the ch enior management on the matter reconstruct. It appeared that Kirk p, the record became more difficult to morale remained low. Denby continued to makeorts to get the team together, but NRL but found that the NRL researchers were not talking as freely with him as they Denby became skeptical about the project's value. Weeks slipped by. No furth breakthroughs emerged. Lacy's Problem Dr. Lacy had Teceived weekly status reports on the project, the latest of which is shown in Exhibit 2. He he principally with North and Kirk. Hawinformal conversations about the project the reports submitted to Exco. If the project had been placed on NRL 's*""problem list.i of the projects which scemed to be experiencing the most dif t0 percent received a written report on its status weekly, but the Exco project was not on With the background given above, Lacy reread Kenney's letter terminating the Exco contract. It seemed likely that Kenney, too, had not had full knowledge of what went on during the project's existence. In his letter, Kenney mentioned the "glowing re- ports" which reached his ears in the early stages of the work. These reports, which came to him only from Denby, were later significantly modified, and Denby appar- had been "leading him on." Kenney pointed to the complete lack of economic evaluation of alternative processes in the experimentation. He seemed unaware of the fact that at Denby's insistence all economic analysis was by the client. Kenney was most dissatisfied that NRL had not f the proposal, particularly those that required full complied with all screening of all materials and the Lacy wondered why Denby's changes of the f the theoretical work the NRL team. Why hadn't he heard more of the problems of the documented by Lacy requested a technical evaluation of the project from the eco t before? director, and asked Davidson for his evaluation of the project. These reports are given in Exhibits additional information he should submit to NRL senior management and 4. When he reviewed these reports, Lacy wondered what, if any, Questions 1. Prepare a list of the problems associated with the Exca project, classifying them into categories that vou consider 2, What should Dr. Lacy recommend be done to avoid similar problems in the future? l action EXHIBIT 1 Organization Chart (simplified) President Vice President Research Operations Faysical Science D Sarn Lacy, Ae ision Electronics Division ames Noble, Head Pr Mac Davidsan. Marketiog Associate Head Materis Laboratory Chemistry Luboratory Electromagnetic Sciences Labaratory Frank Perkins Directar Dimetor Weckly Project Status Report EXHIBIT 2 NOTICES PAat 3G PRONACCT SUB WOWEHK ENDING Dar TYPE EEV TYPE PRICE CLIENT 12-22-73 pOMESTIC PROI INDUS SCA YD 3273 0D COD PROJECTIACCOUNT STATLS REPORT 325 DIVISION PHYSICAL SCI INST EXCO ur KIRK DEPARTMENT ROBERT KIRK MICROWAVES IN CONVERSION OF BASIC ORES AND MINERALS CHEMISTRY LAB TRANSACTIONS RDCOADED 12-4-21-13-31-13 LA TS NO DATE BUBDEN OVERHEA 11:06-74 FEE READY ATE STUP WOR DATE WEHK TO TU 10s c0 ATI 150 28.g0 NAME OBJ -06-72 6.0 ABCR HOUR 13 KIRK 12-22-73 363073 02345 322 DOLLARS BALANCE 02345 22 PIDLJWK Tro DATE ESTIMATE TO TATK CATRGORJES 163r67 25 DENSMORE 13 560 15.0 SUPERVISOR SENIOR (11, 12) 236544 4. COOK 12-22-13 03260 77 12110 12-08-73 1671 36.0 SIONAL 8.0 HOWARD ECHNICAL CLER/SUPP OTHER 376147 5 12-22-73 03 12110 5299 .. (15 579 376149 16, 17. 18) ( (19) 84 12-22-73 25 2357 301 RE 12 72 7 12-22-73 44 40.0 DILLON RO8416 5 15 1238d 1044 LABOR T 13 NAGY 336527 12-22-73 325 12397 150 LLING OVERHEAD DATE 1540 AMOUNT 55110 247s 12-22-73 1227 20 8.0 11-30-73 KAIN 236548 15 11350 KAIN 12-22-73 236548 21 OVERTIME PREM ovs/OTH, PREM TOTAL PERSONNEL 12475 160 652 (21) (22-29) ACCOUNT STATUS 17,0 TE TIME RAYROLT BURDEN 748 154583 BILLED 776 56-59) 1227 154583 SUBCONTRACT PAID OVERHEAD RECOVERY (36) (41, 42) 30.D 60 BOR 3726 DERI MATERIAL 242 R PREMUUM LABOR (43 2820 S EQUIPMENT TOTAL PERSONNEL COSTS COMMUN MATERIALS SERVICES 2 50. 7i: (62, 63, REQUESTUR REF ND OR. PD NO 42 KIRK CONSULTANT REPORT COST OTHER M&S (74, 75 438 REA EXPRESS 54065 48 TIME BALANCE COST BALANCE % 43.5 99TIME BALANCE WKS. 41 61285 39.4 (44, 47) 17234 8741 NAGY * d d pTT 136-6200 0446 56 S TOTAL M&S COSTS 5098 TOTAL M&S coST FEB 26847 BALANCE 3034 T ESTIMATED TRANSACTION TOTAL COMMITMENT o8878 250435 141557 2876 FEE TOTAL L 13189 31565 24376 15F FEE (15.00) 122067 28800D 165933 03 TOTAL COMMITMENT STATUS TO DATE TOTAL CHASGES BALANCE OBJ YENPORDESCRIPTION a NO 61 1 A61289 11-21-73 41 MINNESOTA MINING 345 5 41 5201-2. 3TENNECO CHEMICAL co A9S093 11-15-73 41 UNION CARBIDE CORP 2 2 WATERS & ROGARS 23194 S194 2500 2sr L50 150 300 018046 12-15-73 57 ROGER MD EXHIBIT 3 Tchnical Evaluation EXHIBIT 3 (entinued) BY RONALD M. BENTON Cxccptional capabuiies devoted an unusually Director, Process Economics Program ou sTA D pue THN Aq pauo xplicit expression c car the project termination un ua a Jo ed at o atsap si Principal Conclusions is technically sound. The sented c could bae been greater had this been followed throughout the course of the project "devia hatily, withaut further experiment and careful analysis, and overly or. They re tometimes erroneous and there were frequent tions," Data ws wiven to the lnt as a result a significant amount of the data wa not eproducible. NRL was tnclined to bu but the altered character of the inwestigarion did not prevent accomplishment of fruitful research nd d t d tht ti re n tinn the course of reseach and in interpreting the datn. There is no evidence t Suurega uo paisrsu nts of this roject were as follows a. Extraction of vertile from iron ore by saveral alternative processes. ,jua aq notes that can be placed in this category sassasoud asaqo uopdooo s A Sy uoeuin arquapistuoo paiansnougp pue suonepIsup uttepunt uo pasco SEA papnoun Jo Soda THNoy u 0 Jayay feasibility b. Nitrogen xation the cate of a compuder program that had not been "de-bugged." It war the client who discovered the (The program was eventually straightened out by the d NR of the dierepancies It was, however, shown that the yield of nitrogen oxides was substantially greater than has previ- ously been achieved by either thermal or plasma processes The client's compluint that they were is valid, but it is nol certtin that the given a computer program which had not been "de-bugged" pauJED Jau uM stipu asalt been conducted. It is even j Suisixa nouLs wESod u waui A8 diusuapal aloud beyond very preliminary stages und 1he ultimate axa significance cannot be asscssed aommercial -auuoa a urey nssad 1yd p dts upuy stqio oueu rotary kiln process and then was a r arqisoc uaaq ae 10u pinoa JoJ Jo 3anos pue aoualsixa that microwave plasmas can be generated at c However, it opens the possibility 4. NRL that many processes can be conducted economically pressure p d that the selection of processes for scalo-up and economic studies pauofu by his Engineering Division that this was completely paanpa a Apsoo oo aq piaon e would be the responsibility of the elient. I interpret this Agglameration did take place the first time the process was tried ("open boats") and the client was u papaaxa 1oa sDm THN uve 5. Actual and effective arougndu the conrse of the investi greay a whether lbe original suggestion that a rotary killn be used in the v from the cient or NRI.. In any event, it is a logical choice of equipenent and ertile process came decisions of significance were not documented by NRL and ooly to a limited an Jo pasn a extent by the cient. There was DO attempt on NRL's par to convey the nalure or consequences of asesuap Without the beheft ai at least pt plant would be uneconomic. It is true that a completely 1503 MO1ns O uonangod aouauadxa be in a position to state that such equipment standard rotary kiln probably could not be employcd, if for no otber reason than to preveat the escape of toxic hydrogen sulfide gas f 6. The NRL reports were not well prepured, even considering the circumstances under which thcy were ossible Cqipent. At east special desigo w papaau aq prno. formed as to the overall approach to the investigation 8. bere wis excessive instailed without special desigo and d do not know, of course invoivement oe elent in the details a SEa un pnut mo consideration of major objectives and a ccomplishments progress and adequate 9. In the later stages of the project, the cient tejected a n puada about 45 engineering man-hours, and the design calculations would be more detailed than the sad adhe nur to me, I believe that these judgments were based ona arbitrary opinions as to lechnical feasibility atuouoge leasibility that are probably complete waste even if the proceRs had been basedo a partially false premise o se auaadva ao uo suoeodenxa EI dns pum uouanoa aqL fouon ure the comments responding to the points raised by the client management during your experimental work that i pasie uaaq ou pe alqns ensnu aq pnon ug au pInon uana pu1 eu ruanoo 1. Client anticinated a "full research capabiliry He had hoped for participation by engineers, chem p do 5. The meetings were poorly planned by NRL n fo uonaud o patn0 umod puo sIsaouo I COmpetitor. He feels that the project ore but certainly the extreme frequency of the meetings Como amast exclustvely by chemists. would not be conducive to a well-organized meeting 6. Experimental procedures were not well p This complaint is disciplines appropriate to the investigation (as p ap uy paponoan Amaduo project 1o some degree. In addtion, men of "sd a uo pa ua a (usodand aq u ar su onu se rap u paund aq suauruadxa en atsap J pa ELIIHX papnuo) might conceivably be useful merely for purposes of gatheriag yDEodde ue ons aoueApe ui suo le uno an s p auno pauund PInors o u sa u puE aaiap sq asioaxa Suunsuoo-au ssonme uaaq aABq pinow if NRL had acceded to the request it v As meni q uania ou som cifically excluded NRL from economic evaluations, but NRL did make use of economic considerations in its suggestions and recommendations. w pnposd au g vampou ataunuou auas umgo o1 paruuard THN 8 with them. Many hanged a ay jo asneoaq ino pauue Janau aam paed AmuaLuO suouuadxa Sujaaaas Tikely, therefore, anpuoa aine a e suraas ooud ou o uogoap nm juawuadxa he elienz elatmr that be doer wt critioia NRI r faiting "to produce a process." He says t never expected one, that he wanted a good sereening of ores and reactions as called for in ihe he feels he rom the theorelical studies-Task January 8, 1974 ou seA Ssaoad e uauans ou. expected alod NRL personnel tnvalved that almost immediatcly after the an o asunoo an o Aranuaa Araauo suaos auS From: Mac Davidaon a degree of urgency incompatible with a systematic D an nn mnb aioad theorelical studjes as a part of Task B were never o the whole suoiSnjoo alo 0oxg au.L tenor of the project suggests 4alasa this project igh risk" prgicct. "no nau merely pastponed. Unfortunately, this with other pae punos Atuoruyaa sem ESoduad au.T within the capabilities of the groups assigned t significant effective decisions. project There was virtually in the preparation* Addisional coordination between the working elements of Pbysical Sciences and Electronics the proposal Comments with rew excapdons, was, cobsicring the hanarps critieized by the client's representatives lor having proposed a process (hydrochloric acid pickling) attention to detail NRL reports were not well: written The client, actng nder have access to information of this kind, and ans reaction would certainly have the effect of dis- prepared, even considering the circumstances under rather than steel industry with steel pickling to leaching inquiry to aresponsible person in C.S. Steel as to the starus or hydrochlonc acid pckling. His respDnse there are sitnations ibat are more favorable generally more economical and is becoming increasingly adopted sulfided titanium ore. Nevertheless, I directed an uanh saauey the daor to this kind of interference. to sulfuric acid pickling. hydrochloric a There was nu doeumentation by direction, and i cid pickling is NRL af the decisions made m ua a pauale mphasis of the M NRL were requested by the client, but on an urgent and "not f aDcy" basis. If nqe a o aauanbasuos a anan o Kanooa 0 N 0 ed a uo dae snouas ou sem aay 1odau a z wat te s i re of NRI's Tormel reparts Hawever, the naure a 0 suonoe whon NRL Less than half of the major complaints made by the elient concerning suoas odar an jo PIBA ar aDuBuod s,IN snpLApa ames o prumoi paaap a project team acquiesced too readily easily to the client's ocmands in the client's interference and management ad quiesced too au aur sdee unnars rand am u saram agons e mM srnsand ao cIuoa uanba m SBot understandable to elient's managcment uoddos a1enbopeut aAe pre uostaladns 0arurne the project Recommendations Sty u Japa the establishment of a simple formal procedure by 1 is recommended that consideration be given which high 'spunj ao oqusunuanD, ou aum aaay. identitied at the pa prnoo aloud as assigned for averting or correcting subsequent developments that uonuu a 0 no pae aaes resodoid which s pecific responsibilities are would be adverse to NRLs and the client's i ficient f ytaining obicctive 'upon unphisticated client, nublie or private palitical conditions, sonsuaep auL o os pun 8 uamdde nouun proposal was preped Au a foud su es apeu1e