20. Find all Nash equilibria in the game G of Exercise 2.12.1. Which of these are subgame perfect? 1. Figure 2.18 shows the tree of a strictly competitive game G of perfect infor- mation without chance moves. a. How many pure strategies does each player have? b. List each player's pure strategies using the notation of Section 2.5 c. What play results from the use of the pure strategy pair (l, LM)? d. Find all pure strategy pairs that result in the play [rRI]. e. Write down the strategic form of G. f. Find all the saddle points. Figure 2.18 The game for Exercise 2.12.1. Only question 20, don' t need to do question 1 20. Find all Nash equilibria in the game G of Exercise 2.12.1. Which of these are subgame perfect? 1. Figure 2.18 shows the tree of a strictly competitive game G of perfect infor- mation without chance moves. a. How many pure strategies does each player have? b. List each player's pure strategies using the notation of Section 2.5 c. What play results from the use of the pure strategy pair (l, LM)? d. Find all pure strategy pairs that result in the play [rRI]. e. Write down the strategic form of G. f. Find all the saddle points. Figure 2.18 The game for Exercise 2.12.1. Only question 20, don' t need to do question 1