2.2 Empirical Findings A recent paper by Konrad B Burchardi, Selim Gulesci, Benedetta Lezrva1 and Munshi Sulaiman: "Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidenoe from Tenancy Contracts" studies empirically whether sharecropping reduces agricultural output due to moral hazard. In this question, you will replicate their results. The authors conducted an experiment in Uganda that induced variation in the terms of sharecrop ping contracts. After agreeing to pay 50% of their output to the landlord1 tenants were randomized into three groups: i. Home kept 50% of their output. ii. Others kept 75% of their output. iii. Others kept 50% of output and received: 1. a xed lurnpsum payment. 2. a stochastic llnnpsurn payment. Please familiarize with the paper and work with the data set sharecropping.dta. The data has the following set of variables: 0 '1': Expected output (in PPP USD). 0 qum: Expected output divided by plot size (m2). 0 treat2: a treatment dummy indicating the 75% of output treatment. We have dropped from this data farmer assigned to the group (iii) to simplify the analysis. (e) Why do comparing groups (i) and {ii} allow to test whether farmers exert more effort when they receive a larger share of the output? Honr does this analysis relate to your answer in question 2.1a? [5 points] (i) Calculate summary statistics of the variables in the data set. 1. 1What share of the farmers belong to the pure control group? [3 points] 2- 1What is the average and standard deviation of expected output per squaremeter. [2 points]