22) For this and the following question, consider the stage game below. Assume that player Pl has a discount factor of E [0, 1), and player P2 has a potentially different discount factor 62 E [0, 1). P2 L R P1 U 7, 3 3, 4 D 4, 8 2,9 If this game is repeated three times, what is the highest payoff that Player 1 can get for the whole game, among all possible SPNE of the repeated game? (a) 3 . (1 + 61 + 87) (b) 4 - (1 + 61 + 82) (C) 1-61 (d) 4+3. 61 (e) None of the answers above. 23) If the stage game above is now repeated an infinite amount of times, what is the requirement on 61-the discount factor for Player 1 such that we can have a SPNE of this game where the players play (D, L) in every round of the equilibrium path? (a) Any 61 E [0, 1) (b) 61 2 1/4 (c) 61 2 1/2 (d) 61 2 3/4 (e) 61 = 2