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A classic game of commitment by teenagers is chicken, in which two young people drive toward each other in cars, each committing to staying straight and hoping the other will be the first to swerve (the "chicken"). This game is modeled in the normal-form box below.

Chicken	Teenager 2
Stay straight	Swerve
Teenager 1	Stay straight	-130, -130	26, -13
Swerve	-13, 26	0, 0

Identify any pure strategy equilibria of this game. Choose one or more:

A.(swerve, straight)

B.There are no pure strategy equilibria.

C.(straight, straight)

D.(swerve, swerve)

E.(straight, swerve)

Find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for this game. In it, teenager 1 will stay straight with probability ??? , and teenager 2 will stay straight with probability???. (Give your answers to two decimal places.)