{25 points} Consider the following version of McCall's model. I A worker is innitely-lived. A. worker can be either employed or unemployed. I At the beginning of period If], everyone is unemployed. Each period an unemployed worker receives b. I In class, we considered the setup where an unemployed worker receives ONE offer each period. Differently from that setup, now, an unemployed person receives TWO imlepcmlcnt wage offers each period. I The worker can either accept one of the offers or decline both offers. [She cannot accept both offers.) I If she accepts one of the offers in period t, she becomes employed starting from t+1 and remains employed for all the future periods. I If a person declines both offers, she will receive two offers again in the next period. I Each wage offer can take two values, low and high, denoted by nu, and my. I An unemployed worker receives offers with the following probabilities both offers are low, (11);, out} with probability {1 go}2 only one of the offer is high, {whiny} or {mme} with probability 2p(1p} both offers are high, (WE, toy} with probability p2 I The time discount factor is [l v: ,3 a: 1. I Assume that b i 11.1,; a: top, where to\" is a nite number. I Below the term "value\" refers to the present discounted value. {a} Suppose that Sam is unemployed and follows a simple rule that \"Accept only the high ways o'er\". Given this rule, write the equations characterizing the value of current and future income streams of Sam, denoted by S. {b} Suppose that Marie is also unemployed and follows an opposite rule that \"Having a job is always better than being unemployed, and therefore, accept any waye o'er.\" Write the equations characterizing the value of current and future income streams of Marie, denoted by M. {c} Let ,3 = 0.99, b = {1.3, to; = [1.93, log = 1.02, p = [1.8. Determine whose rule yields a hio'l'lar \"Fat imn inrnmn