26. Suppose the row player has two alternatives A and B. With the equilibrium mixed strategy, the expected payoff of taking A is same as that of taking B.

a. True b. False

27. Suppose both players are using the equilibrium mixed strategy. In what case can the row player possibly be worse off?

a. The column player changes his strategy while the row player remains unchanged.

b. The row player changes his strategy while the column player remains unchanged.

c. Both players change their strategies.

28. Suppose both players are using the equilibrium mixed strategy. What is correct in describing the consequences of row player's unilaterally leaving the strategy?

a. The expected payoff of the row player does not change.

b. The expected loss of the column player does not change.

c. If the column player has noticed that the row player has left the equilibrium strategy, the column player can change his own strategy and beat the row player.

d. Even the column player has noticed that the row player has left the equilibrium strategy, the column player can do nothing to take advantage of it and beat the row player.

e. a, b and c.

29. Suppose both players are using the equilibrium mixed strategy. Which is correct in describing the consequences of both players leaving the equilibrium strategy?

a. The value of the game will remain unchanged.

b. The value of the game will change, and the two players can be both better off or both worse off.

c. The value of the game will change, and one player will be better off, and the other is worse off.

30. A mixed strategy {for row player: 100% taking alternative A, 0% taking alternative B}, {for column player: 0% taking alternative X, 0% taking alternative Y, 100% taking alternative Z} is in fact a pure strategy.

a. True b. False