27) Suppose that, before the start of the game, the Incumbent firm promises to make a sizable payment to the Policymaker if they choose to create environmental regulations for new firms only (RE). Basing your analysis on the concept of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, how do you think the Policymaker would react? (a) The Policymaker would find the promise credible and it could affect their regula- tory decision, if the payment were large enough. (b) The Policymaker would NOT find the promise credible, because after the regula- tion choice is made, the Incumbent would have no incentives to keep its promise as it would only reduce the Incumbent's payoff. (c) The Policymaker would NOT find the promise credible, because the RE regulation hurts the Incumbent's profits. (d) The Policymaker would respond with a counter-offer proposing a higher x, starting a bargaining game. (e) The Policymaker would ask if the Incumbent has funding secured