28 . Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Andrew and Beth, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Andrew and Beth can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 6.00 0 0 5.50 45 247.50 5.00 90 450.00 4.50 135 607.50 4.00 180 720.00 3.50 225 787.50 3.00 270 810.00 2.50 315 787.50 2.00 360 720.00 1.50 405 607.50 1.00 450 450.00 0.50 495 247.50 0 540 0 Suppose Andrew and Beth form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Andrew and Beth agree to split production equally. Therefore, Andrew's profit is $ , and Beth's profit is $ . Suppose that Andrew and Beth have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Andrew says to himself, "Beth and I aren't