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1.(20%) Consider a pricing problem with two sellers, A and B, and 12 buyers, who each have a unit demand for a good provided the price is no more than 4. Each seller can produce a good on order at price 1. Sellers announce prices simultaneously, pa and p pectively. Buyers 1-6 see Player A's price but not Player B's. Likewise buyers 7-12 see Player B's price but not Player A's. Each buyer can choose to buy from the seller whose price he sees or to walk over to the other seller (at a cost of $0.10), when he can buy from that seller or walk back to the seller whose price he saw originally (for another 10c) and buy from her. The payoffs are the standard ones in pricing problems. In addition, buyers have to subtract the cost of travel, if any. What are the equilibrium prices announced by the sellers? Each can choose a price in [1,4].1.(20%) Consider a pricing problem with two sellers, A and B, and 12 buyers, who each have a unit demand for a good provided the price is no more than 4. Each seller can produce a good on order at price 1. Sellers announce prices simultaneously, pa and p pectively. Buyers 1-6 see Player A's price but not Player B's. Likewise buyers 7-12 see Player B's price but not Player A's. Each buyer can choose to buy from the seller whose price he sees or to walk over to the other seller (at a cost of $0.10), when he can buy from that seller or walk back to the seller whose price he saw originally (for another 10c) and buy from her. The payoffs are the standard ones in pricing problems. In addition, buyers have to subtract the cost of travel, if any. What are the equilibrium prices announced by the sellers? Each can choose a price in [1,4]