3. [20 points} Consider a strategic game with 2 players, P1 and P2. Both players make decisions simultaneously. The rst element in any square represents the payoff to P1 and the second element, the payoff to P2. P. I\"- I- El-- (a) Simplify the above game to a 2 x 2 game. Explain the steps of sim- plication. Find all the Nash equilibria for the reduced game, including the mixed-strategy ones. (b) Still consider the reduced 2 x 2 game in (a). Now suppose the players are not \"selsh.\" If the players' actions generate payoffs (y;,y2), then the utility of each player ii = 1,2 is given by u.- = 2y; + yj, where j a xi. Players maximize utility. Find all the Nash equilibria for this game, including the mixedstrategy ones