3. [26] Generate a two-player game in which each player has two possible actions. For payoffs, ensure that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. You may not mimic Matching Pennies (such as by multiplying payoffs by some constant) a) [10] Derive the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for your game. Derive each player's expected payoff in this mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. b) [16] Suppose the game is sequential. Graph the game in extensive form. [2+2] Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium - be certain to specify completely the strategy of the player who moves second. [2+2] Is there a first-mover or a second-mover advantage? [2+2] For the player who moves first, how much would this player pay to go first or go second? [2+2] (i) Row player goes first (ii) Column player goes first