3 3 Player Games {U, D}, Suppose there are 3 players, P1, P2 and P3, with feasible strategies S S2 = {L, R}, S3 = {A, B). The payoffs are summarized in the following payoff matrices: Table 3: Payoff Matrices P3 P1 U D P3 plays A P2 L R 3,3,8 1, 2,-2 0,9,6-4, 13, -2 P1 P3 plays B P2 L U 11,-1,2 D 0,1,4 R 9,5,12 3,-1,3 where in an cell the payoff x, y, z corresponds to P1, P2 and P3 respectively. (a) Are there any strictly or weakly dominant strategies and, if so, which? (b) Are there any strictly or weakly dominated strategies and, if so, which? (c) Does IESDS yield a unique prediction, i.e. is the game dominance solvable? (d) Are there any pure-strategy Nash equilibria and, if so, which?