3. [30 points] (Tragedy of the Commons) Consider two fishers who fish in the same lake. They consume their catch and do not engage in
3. [30 points] (Tragedy of the Commons) Consider two fishers who fish in the same lake. They consume their catch and do not engage in any kind of exchange, nor do they make any agreements about how to pursue their economic activities. Yet the activities of each affect the payoff of the other: the more one fishes, the harder it is for the other to catch fish. The preferences the fishers are represented by the following utility functions: Fisher 1: W1 (e1, ez) = (1/2) (1 -2e2)e1 - e? Fisher 2: U2 (e1, e2) = (1/2) (1 - 2e1)e2 - ez where e; is the amount of time (fraction of a twenty-four-hour day) that fisher i spends fishing, i=1,2. Assume each fisher chooses their strategy, ei, without knowing the strategy chosen by the other. a. Find the best response functions of each fisher. b. Draw the BR functions. c. Find the Nash equilibrium. d. Is the Nash equilibrium Pareto efficient? Explain
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