3. (5 points) Refer to the following game. Q3 in homework 9 is a simultaneous move one shot game. Player 1 (a) What is Player 1's dominant strategy (if they have one)? (b) What is Player 2's dominant strategy (if they have one)? (c) For each of the following options please point out which options constitute a Nash equilibrium? A. 81, t] B. 32,12 C. 82, t3 D. 31,12 4. (5 points) Refer to the normal-form game of price competition in the payoff matrix below. Firm B Low Price High Price Low Price 50, 10 High Price 20, 20 Suppose the game is innitely repeated, and the interest rate is 16 percent. Both rms agree to charge a high price, provided no player has charged a low price in the past. This collusive outcome will be implemented with a trigger strategy that states that if any firm cheats, then the agreement is no longer valid and each rm may make independent decisions. Will the trigger strategy be effective in implementing the collusive agreement? Please explain and show all necessary calculations