3. Assume that voting takes each voter an hour of their time, including travel time. For simplicity, assume each voter has an hourly wage of $20. Two candidates, Abby and Beata are running for office, and each has equal support (50-50) in the population. Each voter gets a benefit of $100 if their candidate wins. a. Assuming voters are evenly split, how many voters must go to the polls for the marginal benefit of voting to be below the marginal cost. In other words, how many voters should we expect there to be? To do this, use a binomial probability distribution with p = 0.5 (HINT, they are some online for various values of N) to determine the probability a voter will be decisive ((i) assume that any tie is resolved with a 50-50 coin flip. (ii) be aware that incentives to vote are greater case where the number of voters is increased from even to odd, than from odd to even) b. What is the net social gain or loss from voting in this world? b. What is the socially optimal number of voters?