Question
3. Consider a collective action game where P(n) = n, S(n) = 3n + 4, N = 100. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium. (b) Compare
3. Consider a collective action game where P(n) = n, S(n) = 3n + 4, N = 100.
(a) Find the Nash equilibrium.
(b) Compare the payoff players get in equilibrium with the payoff they would get if they all chose P.
(c) What is the social-welfare function for this particular game? What value of n maximizes the function. Why is the maximum not n = 100?
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Advanced Accounting
Authors: Joe Hoyle, Thomas Schaefer, Timothy Doupnik
10th edition
0-07-794127-6, 978-0-07-79412, 978-0077431808
