3. Consider the following game. There are two companies, Toyota and Honda, who compete with each other by choosing what quantity of cars to produce. Toyota chooses Qr and Honda chooses QH. The price that prevails in the market depends on the total quantity of cars produced: P = 100 - QT - QH. Marginal cost is constant. It is 40 for Toyota and 40 for Honda. Thus, the profits of the two companies are given by: VT(QT, QH) = (P - MC)QT = (100 - QT - QH - 40) QT VH(QT, QH) = (P - MC)QH = (100 - QT - QH - 40) QH The game is sequential and consists of 2 periods. Toyota chooses its quantity in period 1. Honda chooses its quantity in period 2 having observed Toyota's choice in period 1. Answer the following questions to find the SPNE of this game. a. Find the optimal choice for Honda (QH) given the choice of Toyota (QT) b. Find the optimal choice for Toyota (QT) given the anticipated response by Honda c. What is the SPNE of this game