3. Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity q1q1. Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 1's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose q2q2 and q3q3, respectively. Market demand is given by p(Q)=100-Op(Q)=100-Q, and Q=q1+q2+q3Q=q1+q2+q3. Firm 1's costs are c1(q1)=3q1c1(q1)=3q1, firm 2's costs are c2(q2)=4q2c2(q2)=4q2 and firm 3's costs are c3(q3)=4q3c3(q3)=4q3. Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of qiq1 and q3q3, and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of q1q1 and q2q2. Using these, answer the following questions. a) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses q1=9q1=9, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses q1=100q1=100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? c) (1 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d) (0.5 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity