3. Consider the following strategic-form game. P2 x y 2 W a 3,4 4,7 3.4 10,5 P1 5,3 3,2 2,3 7,4 1, 1 2,1 4,4 6,2 (a) Identify which strategies of each player survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate- gies. Be sure to state at each elimination step which strategy strictly dominates the eliminated strategy. You can restrict attention to pure strategies of this part. (b) Describe all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. (Note: I want the equilibrium profile, not the equilibrium payoffs.) (c) Consider the mixed-strategy o for player 2 of y with probability 0.5 and z with probability of 0.5. Show that o strictly dominate w for player 2? (d) Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the game (that are not pure-strategy Nash equilibria). Hint: Use the fact about o and w from the previous sub-part to reduce the game